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Preface 
The underlying Strategic Study into information transfer obligations of and in-
formation transfer compliance cost incurred by private enterprise (occasionally 
termed administrative burdens) entails part of a PhD route. The conception 
thereof had initially been debated with Prof.Dr. I.Th.M. Snellen, Professor 
Emeritus Public Administration at the Rotterdam Erasmus University, in Janu-
ary 1999. Back then, Professor Snellen showed his inclination to act as supervi-
sor. The factual start of the underlying Strategic Study materialized in Spring 
1999. The intention embraced entails the completion of the PhD route by 
Spring 2002. 
The underlying part of the Strategic Study focuses mainly on subject-related 
history, theoretical foundation and definition. Further studies in this respect 
will also elaborate on an assessment of information transfer compliance cost, 
while employing EIM’s MISTRAL assessment methodology as the key tool. As 
far as known to me, this is the very first study of such dimensions examining 
the theoretical foundation as well as the defining terminology as regards the 
phenomena of information transfer obligations and information transfer 
compliance cost. Obviously, my conceptions recapitulated in the underlying 
Strategic Study are subject to improvement. I therefore invite everyone -
 particularly those who disagree with the hypotheses put forward - to furnish 
reactions to my E-Mail address any@eim.nl. 
Besides to Prof.Dr. Snellen, I owe a great deal of appreciation to Dr. Brigitte 
van der Burg (Raad voor Zelfstandig Ondernemerschap Rzo (Independent En-
trepreneurship Council)), Dr. Maarten Allers (Groningen University) and drs. 
Sander Wennekers (EIM) for their stimulating contribution to the underlying 
part of my study. Furthermore, I am most grateful to my fellow-researchers 
John Boog and Gerard Regter as regards the many stimulating discussions that 
enabled me to capitalize on their huge practical experience with research into 
administrative burdens. Last but not least, I acknowledge the expertise of Mrs 
Shirley Cooper who translated the Dutch version into English, and I am grate-
ful to Dr. Belaid Rettab (EIM) for his critical revision of the entire English text. 
 
André Nijsen, Zoetermeer, July 2000 
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Summary 
Introduction 
The period within which the ‘contrat social’ was, particularly, intended for the 
defence of national borders is now far behind. In a social constitutional state, 
citizens expect from the government to provide social security, friendly envi-
ronment, and good working conditions. Citizens also require adequate provi-
sions of health care, education, infrastructure, etc. 
To finance such public services, the government should be entitled, by law, to 
levy taxes. The wishes of citizens become explicit though in the process of po-
litical democracy. Through this process, the government is assigned several 
tasks (responsibility) and being provided several instruments/tools (authority) 
to be able to meet the above-mentioned expectations. Such responsibility and 
authority of the government are clearly specified in the administrative law. 
Administrative law entails burden for citizens as well as the business commu-
nity. The objective of this law is first, to guarantee the compliance of citizens 
and businesses with the stipulated law and provide the necessary information 
regarding their behaviour and the result of this behaviour, and, second, meet 
their expectations with respect to public services, such as social security, sound 
environment, etc. 
These obligations do generally govern the behaviour of citizens and busi-
nesses: ‘thou shalt or thou shalt not’. The regulations regarding information 
transfer affecting businesses and the related compliance costs are the subject 
of this study. 
In accordance with the administrative law, the government imposes obliga-
tions on citizens and businesses to regulate their behaviour and acquire infor-
mation about their activities for control purposes. 
There are two types of obligations. The first type relates to the ‘content’ of 
these activities and endeavour to achieve compliance of businesses with the 
stipulated norms by society. The second type relates to the compulsory trans-
fer of information by businesses. 
Both citizens and businesses have to deal with such regulations as soon as they 
participate in society. 
The fact that government requires businesses and citizens to comply with the 
obligation to transfer information can also incur costs for the government. 
Take, for example, the cost of monitoring whether businesses or citizens actu-
ally comply with these regulations. Such costs are called administrative costs. 
In this way, three types of costs could be distinguished: 
•  Administrative costs incurred by the government  
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•  Compliance costs applying to the ‘content’ for the account of the business 
or citizens 
•  Transfer of information obligation costs, also called information compli-
ance costs, again for the account of business or citizens. 
The information compliance costs incurred by businesses and citizens are in 
fact hidden costs. No explicit account of these can be found in any administra-
tion kept by citizens or businesses. Even more serious is the fact that the com-
pliance costs for businesses and civilians are not included when compiling the 
National Budget. 
Officials who are responsible for designing new legislation and regulations are 
generally badly informed about the ‘off-budget’ effects of regulations. Usu-
ally, estimates of costs and benefits of legislation and regulations are limited 
to the consequences for the National Budget (‘on-budget’ effects). 
Consequently, when estimating the budget, calculations are, usually, based on 
considerably low budgetary price, and thereby little incentive for reduction of 
costs of regulation is left. 
The hidden costs of regulation in general should not be underestimated. The 
information compliance costs for the Dutch business community was estimated 
to be about 2.2 percent of the GNP (1998). Unnecessary compliance costs may 
have adverse effects on economic growth and employment. Compliance costs 
place a relatively heavy burden on medium-sized and small businesses. 
As a consequence of the one-sided ideological approach to the problem, there 
is insufficient information about the background of the regulation concerning 
the provision of information. Relevant questions in this respect are: How long 
has the interest in information transfer existed? What is the origin of such ob-
ligations and how are they legitimised?  
Although interest in the phenomenon of the obligation to transfer informa-
tion and the accompanying compliance costs has recently increased, little at-
tention has been paid to their theoretical foundation behind which the fol-
lowing questions could be put forward. What sort of process led to their exis-
tence? Which determinants are decisive for information transfer compliance 
costs? Which definition of compliance costs is most meaningful, taking into ac-
count the fact that the objective is to reduce unnecessary costs for society as a 
whole? Which part does the perception of business play?  
This study attempts to fill in the above-mentioned gaps and concentrates on 
the obligation to transfer information and the accompanying compliance costs 
as these apply to businesses. The use of the term ‘information compliance 
costs’ instead of the more commonly used term administrative burdens is a 
well-considered choice being made to account for the ideologically charged 
interpretation of the latter. EIM Business & Policy Research    9 
Increasing recognition 
More than 200 years passed after Pope’s first phase, consciousness of profes-
sionals, before the final phase, monitoring, was reached. The table below 
shows the total overview. The periods cannot be distinguished exactly - there 
is some overlapping. 
Phases of growing consciousness of the costs of information transfer compliance 
Phase  Period* 
Recognition by professionals  ± 1750 - ± 1935 
Quantification  ± 1935 - ± 1995 
Recognition by politicians  ± 1985 - ± 1995 
Effective policy measures  From 1990  
Monitoring  From 1999** 
*  The period stated is approximate. 
**  Only in the Netherlands and, to a lesser degree, in the US. 
It is striking that recognition by politicians has taken so long: approximately 60 
years after the initial quantification of the cost of complying with information 
transfer requirements. From that time onwards, more attention has been paid 
to this issue. This development could be explained by at least five reasons. 
One is the density of regulations. The extent of social regulations to protect 
consumers, employees and the environment increased significantly in the last 
ten years or so. Previously, information regulation was more economic and 
general in nature, especially taxation was dominant. 
Another reason is the increasing interest of politicians to enhance the use of 
information technology in reducing compliance costs. 
A third reason is the fast development of communication technology. 
A fourth reason entails the pulling-back behaviour of governments as a result 
of growing democratisation. 
A fifth reason is the globalisation and accompanied world-wide competition. 
Theoretical framework 
Introduction 
Its important to understand the theoretical background of the regulations ap-
plying to the transfer of information imposed on business and the accompany-
ing costs for business involved in complying with these regulations, the trans-
fer of information compliance costs. For that reason, we developed a theoreti-
cal model. 
The theoretical model 
The core of the theory is that there are two processes involved. One process in 
which the individual preferences of free citizens and businesses are translated  
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into social values, norms, rules of conduct and the obligation to adhere to 
these rules of behaviour. There is a second process in which citizens and busi-
nesses in their role of subjects are obliged to provide information about their 
behaviour or circumstances with reference to the values, norms and rules of 
conduct mentioned previously. These two processes run in opposite directions, 
but both start with the citizen i.e. business. The model has five actors. Citizens 
and business operating within the private domain, parliament and govern-
ment within the public domain and, finally, the implementing institutions 
which can be active within both the private and public domains. The actors are 
all in contact with each other via instruments or tools, as we have called them 
in this model. There are four instruments in this model: elections/business 
lobby, legislation, steering and design. The election/business lobby determines 
the relationship between the citizens/businesses and the parliament. Parlia-
ment and government interact through the instrument of legislation. The 
steering instrument enables the government and institutions to be in close 
contact. And, finally, the design instrument (of both content and the obliga-
tion to transfer information) determines the relationship between the institu-
tions and business i.e. the citizens. Each of these instruments has its own spe-
cific impact on the transfer of information obligation imposed on business 
and, therefore, the accompanying compliance costs. The model assumes that 
each of the four instruments has an effect on the determinants of the compli-
ance costs. The increasing directness of the effect is also considered. The elec-
tion/business lobby effect is most indirect, and the most direct effect is that of 
the implementation instrument. 
Elections/business lobby 
Elections/business lobby have emerged from the collectivisation process which 
has its roots in feudal times. The increasing interdependence between rich and 
poor, posing a threat to the rich (external effects), formed the core of this 
process. Therefore, collective action was necessary. Such collective action took 
the form of obligatory, national and collective welfare arrangement to pre-
vent free riding. Elections and business lobbying, certainly in principle, exert 
significant influence on the choice society makes as to values and norms and, 
therefore, also on the extent and the nature of the content of codes of con-
duct and behaviour and the extent and nature of the transfer of information 
obligations applying to citizens and businesses. 
Legislation 
There are two elements which, as part of the legislation instrument, have a 
fundamental effect on the transfer of information obligations applying to 
businesses: the way in which the rules of behaviour have been specified in leg-
islation and the legitimisation of this legislation. 
Transfer of information obligations belong to administrative law. The way in 
which they are established differs greatly among the various administrative EIM Business & Policy Research    11 
organisations that impose these regulations. There is not one, fully compre-
hensive book for administrative law in general and the transfer of information 
obligations in particular. In general, it is possible to distinguish three clusters 
of administrative law which are relevant for information transfer require-
ments: economic, social and administrative regulations. The importance of so-
cial regulations and the accompanying transfer of information obligations is 
expected to increase. The concerted actions of parliament and government 
lead, often unintentionally, to changes - which are not part of policy - in all 
sorts of legislative domains. Complex information transfer regulations are of-
ten the result. By and large, the way in which information transfer regulations 
have been included in legislation has resulted in very little tuning between the 
various fields of legislation and, in proportion, to considerable complexity. 
There is a direct link between the extent of the legitimisation of legislation or 
a certain information regulation and the extent to which business complies 
with this regulation. To be able to understand this more clearly, it is important 
to distinguish between formal and material legitimisation. Administrative law 
formally empowers the government i.e. government institutions to impose 
transfer of information obligations on businesses. The legitimising function of 
administrative law specifically aims to modify, change the status quo and not 
so much to codify, stipulate social behaviour which has already developed. 
The, in principle, modifying character of administrative law and the informa-
tion transfer regulations which accompany it, indicate the importance of the 
material legitimisation of information transfer regulations. In this context, the 
material legitimisation of legislation is the attitude of businesses towards ob-
jects such as policy-making organisations, political systems, legislation itself 
and general policy making. The foundations on which the material legitimisa-
tion of content obligations and the accompanying transfer of information ob-
ligations rest are their sources, the procedures or their cohesion with business 
values and norms. It is expected that material legitimisation, as a factor which 
indirectly affects the cost of complying with information transfer regulations, 
will be more relevant for the content obligation which includes rules govern-
ing behaviour, rather than for the transfer of information obligations. There 
is, however, the threat of material legitimisation being eroded as a conse-
quence of the extent, complexity, lack of transparency and never-ending 
changes of information transfer regulations. 
Steering 
The government can choose from among three types of steering models to 
steer the institutions which are responsible for implementing content and in-
formation transfer regulations: legal, economic and communicative. The legal 
steering model is enforcing and can impose sanctions. The economic model is 
not, in principle, enforcing and employs financial stimuli: levies and subsidies. 
The communicative model is based on trust and the transfer of information. 
Both the legal and economic steering model recognise both the content and  
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information transfer obligations referred to in our theoretical model. There 
are no content or information transfer regulations in the communicative 
model. 
In order to encourage businesses to comply with the content obligation, the 
government, when steering the implementing institutions, can chose to use ei-
ther stimulating or repressive policy instruments. There is a wide range of such 
instruments. The legal steering model can make use of the policy instruments 
agreement (stimulating) and orders/bans (repressive), but also of many inter-
mediate forms such as permits, covenants and collective labour agreements. 
The economic steering model also offers a great variety of means: subsidies 
(stimulating) and levies (repressive) and everything between the two: credit, 
financial assistance and contributions, tax deductions, etc. We consider all 
transfer of information obligations and the accompanying costs of both stimu-
lating and repressive policy instruments, which are part of the economic and 
the legal steering model, to be transfer of information obligations and trans-
fer of information compliance costs as referred to in our model. The core crite-
rion that led us to this decision is that the information transfer regulations 
which are part of the government’s economic and legal steering model aim to 
achieve social objectives only. It is not the mould into which these regulations 
have been cast, stimulating or repressive, but the objective they aspire to 
achieve which is decisive. 
Design 
The implementing institutions can chose between various means of imposing 
information transfer regulations on businesses. In cohesion with the transfer 
of information compliance costs, both objective and subjective aspects of the 
design of the information transfer regulations are of importance. The objec-
tive aspects of the design refer to the specifications of the regulations and the 
information technology used. The subjective aspects refer to the way in which 
these regulations are viewed by businesses. Ensuring compliance with the con-
tent obligations is an important aspect when setting out the stipulations of 
the information transfer regulations and shaping the relationship between 
the implementing institutions and businesses. 
One of the objective aspects of the design of the information transfer regula-
tions could be that the implementing institutions choose to compel businesses 
to supply the information (bring). On the other hand, there could be reasons 
why the implementing institution chooses to obtain the information from bu-
sinesses itself (fetch). These same institutions also have the right to request the 
business to provide information about third parties. Information logistics, the 
second objective aspect of design, is responsible for the interrogation techni-
ques. 
The subjective aspects of design of information transfer regulations address 
the acceptance, compliance and psychological costs of these regulations for EIM Business & Policy Research    13 
businesses. The acceptance of an information transfer regulation is the fact 
that businesses can agree with this specific regulation. The extent to which 
businesses accept the regulation, influences the intention to take action. To 
act in accordance with, or not in accordance with an information transfer, or 
to comply, can depend on the opinion about this regulation and the intention 
of how to behave, based on this opinion. But also on a large number of other 
factors including, for instance, positive or negative sanctions. When deciding 
whether or not to accept a regulation, the business’ own interests are an im-
portant consideration. It is possible that there is little likelihood of a transfer 
of information obligation being accepted by business if, in the perception of 
business, the regulation is of little or no use for business operations. In such 
cases there can be said to be psychological costs or irritation costs for busi-
nesses. 
Information transfer regulations are one component of the range of preven-
tive measures. The obligation to report about compliance with a content obli-
gation, it is assumed, will increase the chances of actual compliance with this 
regulation. Administrative law has administrative means - monitoring and 
sanction rights - which can be used by the institutions responsible for imple-
menting the regulations to enforce compliance. By imposing the transfer of in-
formation obligations, the implementing institutions compel business to in-
form them about actual behaviour or actual circumstances. Based on this in-
formation, it is possible for the implementing institutions to judge to what ex-
tent, in relation to the social objectives to be achieved, the actual situation is 
in line with the desired behaviour or desired circumstances. In this way, the 
transfer of information obligation is at the head of the chain of administrative 
enforcement methods and is part of the monitoring system. 
The determinants of information transfer compliance costs 
In the theoretical model, the relationships between the actors, which run via 
the four instruments - election/business lobby, legislation. steering and design - 
affect the determinants of the level of information transfer compliance costs. 
These are the final components of the model. Knowledge of the determinants 
leads to insight into the background of the level of information transfer com-
pliance costs. It also becomes apparent where measures could be taken to 
avoid or reduce unnecessary compliance costs. The level of information trans-
fer compliance costs is influenced by a number of exogenous and endogenous 
determinants. Exogenous determinants cannot be influenced by one single bu-
siness but endogenous determinants can. 
Conclusions 
Transfer of information obligations imposed on business are part of a greater 
whole. They are not simply the consequences of arbitrary bureaucratic deci-
sions. Information transfer regulations are an essential part of the democracy 
of the modern constitutional state. It is, however, worthwhile to subject the  
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extent of these regulations to a critical appraisal. The process through which 
the preferences of free citizens and businesses are translated into social values, 
norms, content and information regulations focuses primarily on policy and 
does not pay sufficient attention to implementation aspects such as feasibility, 
enforcement and compliance. This can result in transfer of information obliga-
tions becoming too extensive and unnecessarily complicated for business. This, 
in turn, can lead to unintentional and undesirable social side effects such as in-
sufficient compliance with content obligations by businesses or excessively 
high transfer of information compliance costs for business. 
Conceptualising the term information transfer compliance costs 
The marginalist concept versus the integralist concept 
In general, we reject the marginalist concept of the term transfer of informa-
tion compliance costs. The most important arguments for rejection are as fol-
lows  
The ‘marginalists pur sang’ deny, in our opinion incorrectly, that the transfer 
of information compliance costs should be considered as an integral part of 
business operations. We do not consider the exclusion of avoidable costs, for 
example as the consequence of taking advice or applying for subsidies and 
permits, to have any point. 
The attraction of the ‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’ gains its merit from 
the idea that compliance belongs to the integral functions of the business and 
in the acceptance of ‘the costs which a reasonable man would incur’. In this 
way, the costs for the tax consultant and for applying for subsidies and permits 
are part of the transfer of information compliance costs. 
The ‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’, however, do not succeed in making 
a clear distinction between the costs of normal business operations on the one 
hand and the extra costs as a consequence of information transfer compliance 
on the other. The fiction which they ply - the extra costs are the costs that 
would no longer exist should there be no regulation - is not feasible in daily 
business practice. For us, this is the most important reason to distance our-
selves from the opinions of the ‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’. 
Then there is also the question of the gross, ‘social compliance costs’ or net in-
formation transfer compliance costs, ‘tax payer compliance costs’. The net in-
formation transfer compliance costs are considered to be less meaningful for 
our purposes. By deducting all sorts of items of varying origin from the infor-
mation transfer compliance costs there will no doubt be a good picture of the 
definite costs for the business that complies with the information transfer 
regulation. One important disadvantage is that the view of the real costs of 
information transfer is lost. This objection no longer applies, of course, once 
both the gross and net transfer of information compliance costs are available. EIM Business & Policy Research    15 
We opt for the gross transfer of information compliance costs, or, in other 
words, the ‘social compliance costs’. 
And now we are back to our own integralist concept of the transfer of infor-
mation compliance costs. Why did we choose this? First and foremost, because 
the integralist concept connects well to the basic idea of our theoretical model 
which is that compliance with information transfer regulations is an integral 
function of business operations. And with this we choose in principle for the 
information logistics approach. So, information compliance costs are the inte-
gral costs of all the proceedings to comply with information obligations in an 
adequate way and which proceedings a business cannot ignore without of-
fending against the law. To comply in an adequate way refers to the ‘lawyers 
concept’. That’s why avoidable costs like the costs of asking for advice belong 
to the integral information compliance costs. This is what we call the funda-
mental argument. 
In addition, there is also the practical argument that business would not be 
able to imagine a situation without legislation and regulation. Finally, using 
the bookkeeping obligation  as an example, we have shown that only specifi-
cally stipulated information obligations  result in the transfer of information 
compliance costs. 
Integralist definition of information compliance costs 
Having looked at all aspects, we now arrive at the following definition of 
structural and one-off information transfer compliance costs. 
Structural information transfer compliance costs 
 
Structural information transfer compliance costs are the integral costs of 
the annually recurring administrative proceedings connected to comply-
ing with the obligation to transfer information, as specifically stipulated 
in the regulation applying to businesses operating in country X, to the 
government or comparable body of country X, which obligation business 
cannot ignore without offending against the law. The government or 
comparable body of country X uses the information thus obtained to 
check and maintain compliance with content obligations deemed by soci-
ety to be of value.  
This definition contains a number of core elements which require some expla-
nation: 
•  Structural costs: the annually recurring costs for compliance with transfer of 
information obligations. 
•  Integral costs: the integral cost price of all the administrative proceedings 
actions which are necessary to comply with a transfer of information obli-
gation. This refers to Sandford’s lawyers concept. Only those reasonable 
costs can be counted as belonging to the information transfer compliance  
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costs regulation. As we, following Dean’s example, consider compliance 
with the transfer of information obligation as an integral function of busi-
ness operations, the overhead costs are, in proportion, included. 
•  Administrative proceedings: all activities that are necessary for the compul-
sory transfer of information to the government or the implementing insti-
tution. These actions include the 14, mainly administrative, actions men-
tioned in paragraph 3.9. 
•  Regulation: all legislation and regulation used by the central government 
and lower authorities together with other bodies with delegated authority, 
to control their legal relationship with businesses in connection with so-
cially stipulated behaviour. These also include grey regulations. 
•  Specifically stipulated information transfer obligation: accurate and precise 
definition in legislation and regulation of the content of the information 
that the business must provide to the government or implementation insti-
tution. This passage clearly defines the distinction between this and the 
generic information which is stored in the business administration. 
•  Businesses operating in country X: within the terms of reference of this 
study, the subject is the Netherlands and the legislation and regulations 
that apply to the Dutch and foreign businesses operating on Dutch terri-
tory. This definition is important in order to prevent double counts should 
international comparative studies be made. Business is taken to include all 
private individuals and legal persons who are engaged in business and not 
in the government sector, in the sense of the internationally applicable 
definitions according to the National Accounts. 
•  Government or comparable body of country X: de Dutch government and 
comparable Dutch bodies. 
•  Which a business cannot ignore without offending against the law: this re-
fers to the legal obligation to transfer information and is the core of the 
definition. It indicates explicitly that information transfer compliance costs 
are not exclusively the extra costs that would disappear should the law dis-
appear (the concept of the marginalists). The transfer of information com-
pliance costs are the costs of all the administrative proceedings required to 
actually execute the information transfer, whether these actions are of any 
use for the businesses’ own operations or not. 
•  Content obligations regulations deemed by society to be of value: rules of 
behaviour/conduct which apply to values and norms, laid down by parlia-
mentary decree in legislation or regulation or in grey regulations derived 
from these. 
One-off transfer of information compliance costs 
The definition of one-off transfer of information compliance costs is identical 
to that for structural transfer of information compliance costs, as long as it is 
remembered that this applies only to situations in which there are major 
changes to existing laws and regulations, or new laws and regulations. EIM Business & Policy Research    17 
1 Introduction 
1.1  ‘Le contrat social’ 
‘L’homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers. Quést-ce qui peut le ren-
dre légitime
1? 
Rousseau (1762) started his debate about the identity from the above question 
to develop his ideology of democratic identity based on the hypothesis of the 
voluntarily accepted agreement of social behaviour, the ‘contrat social’. This 
agreement would involve the acceptance of general laws and regulations, 
ideally by common intent, but in reality through the vote of the majority.
2 The 
principle of political democracy can now be considered to be the dominant 
identity principle in the twentieth century of developed Western society
3. 
The period within which the ‘contrat social’ was, particularly, intended for the 
defence of national borders is now far behind. In a social constitutional state, 
citizens expect from the government to provide social security, friendly envi-
ronment, and good working conditions. Citizens also require adequate provi-
sions of health care, education, infrastructure, etc. 
To finance such public services, the government should be entitled, by law, to 
levy taxes. The wishes of citizens become explicit though in the process of po-
litical democracy. Through this process, the government is assigned several 
tasks (responsibility) and being provided several instruments/tools (authority) 
to be able to meet the above-mentioned expectations. Such responsibility and 
authority of the government are clearly specified in the administrative law. 
Administrative law entails burden for citizens as well as the business commu-
nity. The objective of this law is first, to guarantee the compliance of citizens 
and businesses with the stipulated law and provide the necessary information 
regarding their behaviour and the result of this behaviour, and, second, meet 
their expectations with respect to public services, such as social security, sound 
environment, etc. 
These obligations do generally govern the behaviour of citizens and busi-
nesses: ‘thou shalt or thou shalt not’. The regulations regarding information 
transfer affecting businesses and the related compliance costs are the subject 
of this study. 
 
1 Quoted  from  ‘Le contract social’, Rousseau, 1762. 
2   C.J. Friedrich, Man and his Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics, McGraw-Hill, New 
York/San Francisco, 1963, p. 234. 
3  A. Hoogenwerf, M.J. Arendtsen and P.J. Kok, 1993.  
18    EIM Business & Policy Research 
1.2  Obligations issuing from administrative law 
Introduction 
In accordance with the administrative law, the government imposes obliga-
tions on citizens and businesses to regulate their behaviour and acquire infor-
mation about their activities for control purposes. 
There are two types of obligations. The first type relates to the ‘content’ of 
these activities and endeavour to achieve compliance of businesses with the 
stipulated norms by society. The second type relates to the compulsory trans-
fer of information by businesses. 
Both citizens and businesses have to deal with such regulations as soon as they 
participate in society. 
Businesses 
Taxation, for example, is a legislation whereby the government imposes both 
types of obligations on businesses. Corporate tax, in its content, implies the 
payment of due tax, while the information transfer obligation allows the tax 
authorities to control whether the payment is made accordingly. 
In our view, the so-called ‘third-party disclosures’ should be considered as con-
tent obligations and not as information obligations. In the case of ‘third-party 
disclosures’, businesses are obliged e.g. to give product information to con-
sumers or to inform citizens about privacy aspects. On the other hand, inform-
ing government about the compliance with ‘third-party disclosures’ should be 
considered as information obligations. 
As a result, businesses are confronted with two types of costs. First, the corpo-
rate tax paid, which is part and parcel of the costs of compliance with the stan-
dards, and, second, the integral costs of compliance with the obligation to 
transfer information. 
Citizens 
Both types of obligations are applicable for citizens as well. For example, the 
Planning Act, the Housing Act and Building Regulations impose obligations on 
citizens when renovating or expanding their dwellings. The construction work 
has to meet certain standards, which could be viewed as a first type of obliga-
tion ‘content’. The local authorities also wish to be informed about the pro-
posed alterations before they are willing to issue a building-permit, this is the 
second type of obligation, namely information transfer.
1  
 
1  There may be many other government regulations to comply with by citizens. For instance, 
should the citizen - if he suffers loss of income because of illness/disablement, unemployment, 
divorce - apply for social benefits, he first has to comply with both types of obligations, ‘con-
tent’ and ‘information obligation’. In this case the first type of obligation (‘content’) could be 
certain rules of conduct to be observed when cohabiting. The second (‘information obliga-
tion’) compliance can for example involve reporting additional income to the Social Benefit EIM Business & Policy Research    19 
Government 
The fact that government requires businesses and citizens to comply with the 
obligation to transfer information can also incur costs for the government. 
Take, for example, the cost of monitoring whether businesses or citizens actu-
ally comply with these regulations. Such costs are called administrative costs. 
Three types of costs and communicating vessels 
In this way, three types of costs could be distinguished: 
•  Administrative costs incurred by the government 
•  Compliance costs applying to the ‘content’ for the account of the business 
or citizens 
•  Transfer of information obligation costs, also called  compliance costs, 
again for the account of business or citizens. 
It is, however, important to recognise that the administrative costs incurred by 
the government and the information costs incurred by business or citizens are 
often communicating vessels. Van Lunteren speaks of a ‘ménage á trois’, in 
which all the interested parties join in the game of ‘passing the buck’.
1 
The government may reduce its administrative costs - for example those con-
nected to keeping records - by insisting that businesses use a bookkeeping sys-
tem so that the government needs only to receive the results. The government 
makes considerable use of banks; in particular, to provide information that 
enables the government to monitor to what extent the clients comply with 
law. Examples of such regulations are reporting about interest and dividend 
but also about extraordinary transactions, e.g. money laundering. 
The banks are required, annually, to inform the Tax Department about any in-
terest or dividend earned by individual account holders or depot holders. This 
is to facilitate the Income Tax Authorities in claiming the correct amount of in-
come tax. 
1.3 Hidden  costs 
The compliance costs incurred by businesses and citizens are in fact hidden 
costs. No explicit account of these can be found in any administration kept by 
citizens or businesses. Even more serious is the fact that the compliance costs 
for businesses and civilians are not included when compiling the National 
Budget. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Services, and filling in the annual income tax form, an example of an ever re-occurring obliga-
tion. 
1  J.N. van Lunteren, ‘Lightening of administrative formalities in tax-legislation’, in: Improving 
the Quality of Legislation in Europe (ed. A.E. Kellermann, G. Ciavarini Azzi, S.H. Jacobs, R. 
Deighton-Smith), T.M.C. Asser Instituut, Den Haag 1998, Kluwer Law International.  
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Officials who are responsible for designing new legislation and regulations are 
generally badly informed about the ‘off-budget’ effects of regulations. Usu-
ally, estimates of costs and benefits of legislation and regulations are limited 
to the consequences for the National Budget (‘on-budget’ effects). In this re-
spect, van der Bij refers to internal and external regulation costs.
1 Regulation 
costs which are included in the National Budget are termed internal regulation 
costs, the remaining regulation costs, which remain outside the budget
2, are 
termed external regulation costs. 
Consequently, when estimating the budget, calculations are, usually, based on 
considerably low budgetary price, and thereby little incentive for reduction of 
costs of regulation is left. 
Nowadays, this problem is internationally recognised. ‘The perceived intru-
siveness of government regulation in many OECD countries could be detected 
only through anecdotal information, partial indicators and general impres-
sions. Systematic efforts to track and account for regulatory effects are un-
common despite a recognition that the scope of regulation is broad indeed.’
3 
1.4  The cost of complying with information transfer requirements is 
substantial 
The hidden costs of regulation in general should not be underestimated. Both 
citizens and businesses take measures to comply with the regulations concern-
ing information transfer imposed upon them by the government. Such meas-
ures are accompanied by significant costs which otherwise would not be nec-
essary. EIM estimated these costs for the Dutch business community to be 
about NLG 16.5 thousand million, i.e. 2.2 percent of the GNP (1998).
4 Estimates 
of the cost of complying with information transfer for business within other 
countries of the European Union vary from 3 to 4 percent of the GNP.
5 The 
annual compliance costs for citizens as related to taxation, benefits and subsi-
dies were estimated to amount to about NLG 2.6 thousand million 
 
1  J. van der Bij, Kosten van regelgeving, Regelmaat 1994, p. 227 e.v. 
2  J. van der Bij gives the example of what he terms external regulation costs, those connected 
with  pay roll tax administration and compiling annual tax report. 
3  Th.D. Hopkins, ‘Developing general indicators of regulatory costs’, in: Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, Best Practices in OECD countries, OECD, Paris 1997, p. 264. 
4  J.J. Boog e.a., Monitor Administratieve Lasten Bedrijven: 1993-1998; Doelstelling Paars I ge-
toetst, EIM, Zoetermeer 1999. 
5 EIM,  The European Observatory for SMEs (1995), Third Annual Report, EIM, the Netherlands, 
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(1991/1992).
1 In terms of 1998 real prices, these costs amount to approximately 
400 thousand million guilders. 
1.5  Brake on economic growth 
To an increasing extent, it is becoming recognised that unnecessary compli-
ance costs may have adverse effects on economic growth and employment. 
Compliance costs place a relatively heavy burden on medium-sized and small 
businesses. For this reason, a policy is being developed, both nationally and in-
ternationally, to aim at eliminating or preventing unnecessary compliance 
costs - in particular for small and medium-sized businesses.
2 Sandford argues 
that tax compliance costs have undesirable distributional effects. They are ca-
pricious in their incidence, regressive and fall with disproportionate severity on 
small firms in particular. Moreover, small firms suffer from a disadvantaged 
position being created by the state. Additionally, tax compliance costs fall 
much more heavily on the self-employed than on employees.
3 
1.6  Ideologically charged policy discussions 
Generally speaking, policy discussions about information compliance costs are 
characterised, on the one hand, by their highly practical content and, on the 
other, by their very ideological content. The ‘Leitmotiv’ for many discussions 
can be best described by mottoes such as ‘cut the red-tape burden’ and ‘Büro-
kratieüberwälzung’. 
One illustration of the tone of the political debates on this subject in the US is 
revealed by the remarks made by Senator John Glenn: ‘… Together, I believe, 
these expanded agency requirements provide the greatest opportunity for 
progress in the war against red tape’.
4 The focus is often one-sided, aiming to 
reduce the costs of information compliance, but paying little attention to the 
benefits for society. Another aspect is that, through the ties with the informa-
tion compliance costs, the political objectives and the regulation itself have 
become, indirectly, the subject of discussion. 
 
1 M.  Allers,  Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation and Public Transfers in the Nether-
lands, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Groningen 1994, Wolters Noordhoff. 
2 OECD,  Regulatory Impact Aanalysis, Best Practices in OECD countries, and EIM, The European 
Observatory for SMEs, Third Annual Report. 
3  C. Sandford, ‘The rise and rise of tax compliance costs’, in: Tax Compliance Costs Measurement 
and Policy, Ed. by C. Sandford, Fiscal Publications in association with the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, Redwook Books, Trowbridge Wiltshire 1995, p. 5. 
4   Floor remarks of Senator John Glenn, 141 Cong. Rec. S 5276 (April 6, 1995) in: The Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995: Implementing Guidance for OMB Review of Agency Information Col-
lection, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, June 
1999, p. 54.  
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As a result of the above one-sided approach, policy aiming at reducing infor-
mation compliance costs now unnecessarily finds itself in a political field of in-
fluence. This is an adverse effect on the effectiveness of the policy. One exam-
ple of this is the United States where making information compliance costs a 
political issue has proved to be an obstacle to the further reduction of these 
costs.
 1 
1.7  Need for definitions and more information 
Introduction 
As a consequence of the one-sided ideological approach to the problem, there 
is insufficient information about the background of the regulation concerning 
the provision of information. Relevant questions in this respect are: How long 
has the interest in information transfer existed? What is the origin of such ob-
ligations and how are they  legitimised?  
Although interest in the phenomenon of the obligation to transfer informa-
tion and the accompanying compliance costs has recently increased, little at-
tention has been paid to their theoretical foundation behind which the fol-
lowing questions could be put forward. What sort of process led to their exis-
tence? Which determinants are  decisive for information transfer compliance 
costs? Which definition of compliance costs is most meaningful, taking into ac-
count the fact that the objective is to reduce unnecessary costs for society as a 
whole? Which part does the perception of business play?  
Approach of the study 
This study attempts to fill in the above-mentioned gaps and concentrates on 
the obligation to transfer information and the accompanying compliance costs 
as these apply to businesses. The use of the term ‘information compliance 
costs’ instead of the more commonly used term administrative burdens is a 
well-considered choice being made to account for the ideologically charged 
interpretation of the latter. In business economics, the term perception costs is 
used to indicate the same concept as information compliance costs.
2 
Problem definition 
This report deals with the theoretical background of the study and pays atten-
tion to the historical review of the phenomenon of information transfer com-
 
1   Commissie Administratieve Lasten, Regels zonder overlast, Eindrapport, Den Haag, 25 novem-
ber 1999, p. 5. 
2   EIM, Nota betreffende de uitkomsten van een onderzoek naar het niveau van de perceptie-
kosten in het midden- en kleinbedrijf. Business Economics Publications, ’s-Gravenhage, Febru-
ary 1970. EIM Business & Policy Research    23 
pliance costs. Briefly speaking,  this report will attempt to answer the follow-
ing questions. 
1.  Which stages in the recognition of the phenomenon information transfer 
compliance costs could be distinguished in the various countries of the EU 
and the OECD? 
2.  Which are the hypothetical determinants of the level of compliance costs? 
3.  Which regulations does the government impose on businesses? 
−  Which types of regulations could be distinguished? 
−  What is their origin? 
−  How are they legitimised? 
4.  What are the information transfer compliance costs for businesses? 
−  Which types of compliance costs could be distinguished? 
−  How could information transfer compliance costs be defined? 
−  What is the definition of information transfer compliance costs? 
Outline 
Chapter 2 provides a historical review of the increasing consciousness of the 
social importance of information transfer compliance costs. In Chapter 3, the 
theoretical framework for the two central themes - the obligation to transfer 
information and the costs of compliance - are dealt with. The definition of the 
term compliance costs will be given in Chapter 4. The report starts with a 
summary. 
1.8 Summary 
The period within which the ‘contrat social’ was, particularly, intended for the 
defence of national borders is now far behind. In a social constitutional state, 
citizens expect from the government to provide social security, friendly envi-
ronment, and good working conditions. Citizens also require adequate provi-
sions of health care, education, infrastructure, etc. 
To finance such public services, the government should be entitled, by law, to 
levy taxes. The wishes of citizens become explicit though in the process of po-
litical democracy. Through this process, the government is assigned several 
tasks (responsibility) and being provided several instruments/tools (authority) 
to be able to meet the above-mentioned expectations. Such responsibility and 
authority of the government are clearly specified in the administrative law. 
Administrative law entails burden for citizens as well as the business commu-
nity. The objective of this law is first, to guarantee the compliance of citizens 
and businesses with the stipulated law and provide the necessary information 
regarding their behaviour and the result of this behaviour, and, second, meet 
their expectations with respect to public services, such as social security, sound 
environment, etc.  
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These obligations do generally govern the behaviour of citizens and busi-
nesses: ‘thou shalt or thou shalt not’. The regulations regarding information 
transfer affecting businesses and the related compliance costs are the subject 
of this study. 
In accordance with the administrative law, the government imposes obliga-
tions on citizens and businesses to regulate their behaviour and acquire infor-
mation about their activities for control purposes. 
There are two types of obligations. The first type relates to the ‘content’ of 
these activities and endeavour to achieve compliance of businesses with the 
stipulated norms by society. The second type relates to the compulsory trans-
fer of information by businesses. 
Both citizens and businesses have to deal with such regulations as soon as they 
participate in society. 
The fact that government requires businesses and citizens to comply with the 
obligation to transfer information can also incur costs for the government. 
Take, for example, the cost of monitoring whether businesses or citizens actu-
ally comply with these regulations. Such costs are called administrative costs. 
In this way, three types of costs could be distinguished: 
•  Administrative costs incurred by the government 
•  Compliance costs applying to the ‘content’ for the account of the business 
or citizens 
•  Transfer of information obligation costs, also called compliance costs, again 
for the account of business or citizens. 
The compliance costs incurred by businesses and citizens are in fact hidden 
costs. No explicit account of these can be found in any administration kept by 
citizens or businesses. Even more serious is the fact that the compliance costs 
for businesses and civilians are not included when compiling the National 
Budget. 
Officials who are responsible for designing new legislations and regulations 
are generally badly informed about the ‘off-budget’ effects of regulations. 
Usually, estimates of costs and benefits of legislations and regulations are lim-
ited to the consequences for the National Budget (‘on-budget’ effects). 
Consequently, when estimating the budget, calculations are, usually, based on 
considerably low budgetary price, and thereby little incentive for reduction of 
costs of regulation is left. 
The hidden costs of regulation in general should not be underestimated. The 
information compliance costs for the Dutch business community was estimated 
to be about 2.2 percent of the GNP (1998). Unnecessary compliance costs may 
have adverse effects on economic growth and employment. Compliance costs 
place a relatively heavy burden on medium-sized and small businesses. EIM Business & Policy Research    25 
As a consequence of the one-sided ideological approach to the problem, there 
is insufficient information about the background of the regulation concerning 
the provision of information. In this respect, relevant questions are: How long 
has the interest in information transfer existed? What is the origin of such ob-
ligations and how are they legitimised?  
Although interest in the phenomenon of the obligation to transfer informa-
tion and the accompanying compliance costs has recently increased, little at-
tention has been paid to their theoretical foundation behind which the fol-
lowing questions could be put forward. What sort of process led to their exis-
tence? Which determinants are decisive for information transfer compliance 
costs? Which definition of compliance costs is most meaningful, taking into ac-
count the fact that the objective is to reduce unnecessary costs for society as a 
whole? Which part does the perception of business play?  
This study attempts to fill in the above-mentioned gaps and concentrates on 
the obligation to transfer information and the accompanying compliance costs 
as these apply to businesses. The use of the term ‘information compliance 
costs’ instead of the more commonly used term administrative burdens is a 
well-considered choice being made to account for the ideologically charged 
interpretation of the latter. 
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2 Increasing  recognition 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the eighties, interest in information transfer compliance costs has in-
creased reasonably, not only in the Netherlands but also in the other EU and 
OECD countries. Most attention has been paid to the field of fiscal legislation 
because this area is responsible for a substantial part of the total costs. It ap-
pears to be plausible then to assume that the conclusions drawn in literature 
concerning the increasing awareness regarding cost of complying with the 
transfer of information obligation in the fiscal area will, on the whole, also 
apply to other areas of legislation. 
Pope distinguishes five phases in the recognition of information transfer com-
pliance costs for Australia:
1 
•  Recognition of quality by professionals (economists, tax consultants, etc.) 
•  Quantifying the scope 
•  Recognition by politicians: the subject is placed on the political agenda 
•  Development of policy measures aiming at lightening the burden of com-
pliance costs 
•  Monitoring the developments. 
It seems plausible that these various stages of consciousness are recognisable 
in more countries than Australia.
2  
The five stages that have been distinguished will be dealt with one by one 
later in this chapter. 
First of all, general comments will be made for each of the above listed stages. 
Subsequently, attention will be paid to the experience in EU and OECD coun-
tries, and, concludingly, by reviewing the situation in the Netherlands. 
2.2 Recognition  by  professionals 
General 
The issue of information transfer compliance costs started to draw serious at-
tention since the second half of the 18th century. However, professionals have 
been familiar with this issue for a longer time. As early as 1778, in his Wealth 
of Nations, Adam Smith reported four theories concerning the levying of 
taxes: Equity, Certainty, Convenience and Economy, that referred to compli-
 
1 J.  Pope,  The Compliance Costs of Personal Income Taxation - a Review of the Lessons, Discus-
sion Paper 89.03, Nedlands: Department of Economics, University of Western Australia, pp. 2-7. 
2 M.  Allers,  Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation and Public Transfers in the Nether-
lands, Wolters-Noordhoff, RUG, Groningen 1994, p. 7. EIM Business & Policy Research    27 
ance and compliance costs.
1 Economic theory refers most directly to the costs 
of information transfer compliance: ‘every tax ought to be so contrived as 
both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as pos-
sible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state’. 
His theory of Equity received by far the most attention as far as policy is con-
cerned, and only lip service was paid to the other three.
2 Accordingly, this re-
mained so until the second half of the 20
th century.
3 
EU, OECD and the Netherlands 
As far as recognition by professionals is concerned, there is nothing special to 
report about the Netherlands. The same holds for EU and OECD countries, 
which entered the picture much later. 
2.3 Quantification 
General 
Since the recognition of the information transfer compliance costs by profes-
sionals, it took two centuries before the first concrete steps were taken to-
wards the quantification thereof. 
The first step involved the information transfer compliance costs for levying 
taxes in the United States and Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom and Ireland. The initial investigation in this field 
took place in 1930 (United States). In Europe, the first studies on this subject 
were carried out in the forties (the Netherlands), to be followed in the fifties 
and sixties by Germany and Switzerland, and by England and Ireland in the 
seventies and eighties.
4  
Except the legislation, which regulates the transfers (taxes/premiums and so-
cial benefits/subsidies) between government on the one hand and citizens and 
 
1 Smith,  Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 5, Chapter 2. See 
e.g. Smith [1966, pp. 307-309]. 
2  C.T. Sandford, M.R. Godwin, P.J.W. Hardwick, Aministrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation, 
Fiscal Publications, Bath, 1989. 
3  M. Allers (1994), p. 8. Allers gives one exception: R. McCulloch (1975, first published in 1845, 
pages 38 and 399, who emphasises that the last three theories mentioned are actually the 
most important. He even provides some estimates of administrative costs as examples of taxes 
that offend against these rules. In France, for example, 120 million livres were spent to acquire 
30 million (net) in taxation. 
4  To obtain a complete review of a great many Dutch, German and English studies in this field, 
refer M. Allers, Administration and Compliance Costs of Taxation and Public Transfer in the 
Netherlands. Groningen University, 1994, Appendix B, Review of earlier studies on operating 
costs.  
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businesses on the other, no quantification of information compliance costs 
took place up to the nineties. 
EU en OECD 
In the EU and OECD, the first attempts to quantify information transfer com-
pliance costs were made in the middle of the nineties. For example in 1995, a 
comparative study was carried out in all the Member States of the EU about 




As mentioned previously, the first attempts to quantify the costs of complying 
with information transfer for tax levies were made for the Netherlands in the 
forties. Up to 1994, except a study carried out by Allers (1994) for the situation 
in the Netherlands in 1990, there were no studies at all which assessed the cost 
of complying with information transfer regulations for social benefits and sub-
sidies. But, since 1994 onward, serious attempts were made for the Nether-
lands to quantify the costs involved in complying with the regulations for the 
transfer of information, not only in the sphere of taxes but also in other areas 
such as social benefits and subsidies. Most of these studies were carried out by 
EIM.
2  
2.4 Recognition  by  politicians 
General 
Once the substantial amounts involved in complying with the transfer of in-
formation obligation became commonly known - in the eighties and begin-
ning of the nineties - politicians in the various countries became able to place 
this subject on the political agenda. 
European Union 
General 
Nevertheless, political consciousness, as regards the issue of information trans-
fer compliance costs for businesses, increased considerably within the Euro-
pean Union in the eighties and nineties. 
At the European Union level, the general principle is to prepare European leg-
islation in the form of directives to be implemented in national legislation al-
 
1   EIM, The European Observatory for SMEs (1995), Third Annual Report, Theme Study Adminis-
trative Burdens, chapter 14, EIM, the Netherlands, Zoetermeer. 
2   J.J. Boog e.a., Administratieve Lasten Bedrijven 1993, EIM, Zoetermeer, 1994. From 1994 on-
wards, EIM carried out far more studies in the field of information compliance costs.  EIM Business & Policy Research    29 
lowing it to fit better with the existing practical execution in the Member 
States. As far as the Union’s own legislation is concerned, it is worthwhile 
mentioning that the process of ‘regulatory reform in the European Union’ has 
paid attention to information compliance costs. This programme consists of 
the following elements: 
•  ‘Better Lawmaking’, based on the principles of subsidiarity and proportion-
ality. The final objective is the simplification, consolidation and improve-
ment of transparency of European legislation. In the meantime, the Com-
mission has issued a progress report.
1 
•  The Single Market Programme, the most important EU legislation pro-
gramme for business. The completion of the Common Market itself had 
considerable influence on regulatory reform. This included: 
−  the revoke, simplification and standardisation of legislation in almost 
300 areas of legislation; 
−  the revoke of thousands of laws and regulations at national, Member 
State, level; 
−  replacing these with new laws and regulations which regulate many as-
pects of business behaviour; 
−  the SLIM-initiative, Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market, with as 
subject the existing legislation of the Common Market itself. 
•  The EU Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Policy (SME Policy), which in-
cludes special attention to be paid to the application of the regulatory re-
form in order to simplify and improve the administrative and regulatory 
environment. 
•  Development of analysis tools, such as a tool for business impact assess-
ment, to estimate the cost effectiveness of proposed measures (ex-ante ap-
praisal of legislation). In 1985 the Commission adopted the principle that 
every Commission’s proposal for legislation sent to the Council must be ac-
companied by an assessment of its impact on business, SMEs in particular, 
and on job creation. The procedure became operative on 1 June 1986. In 
carrying out the assessment, the Directorate-General has to take into ac-
count compliance costs and the potential administrative burden for busi-
ness
2. 
•  Working Parties (Monitor Group and BEST, the Business Environment Sim-
plification Task Force), Conferences (the Birmingham conference on simpli-
 
1   European Commission (1997), Better Lawmaking 1997, Com(97) 626 final. 
2  For more references on this topic, see: 
  European Communities (1993), Bulletin of the European Union, EC 10-1993, p. 128. 
  European Commission (1994/1996), Integrated Programme in favour of SMEs and the Craft 
Sector, 1994, Com (94) 207 final, and Com (96) 329 final. 
￿  The European Parliament (1997), Report on Strengthening the Business Impact Assessment Sys-
tem, no. A4-0413/96 of 24
th April 1997.  
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fication in 1992, the conference in The Hague in 1997 on the quality of 
European and national legislation in relation to the Internal Market). 
•  European Business Panel, to introduce the direct experience of enterprises 
into the review of this area of legislation. 
The individual Member States  
There are also indications for increasing consciousness within the individual 
Member States of the EU. The afore-mentioned study on compliance costs, 
which covered the several Member States, showed that there was still a con-
siderable degree of variation in the strategies, policies and measures adopted 
in the different countries and that in some countries, the reduction of admin-
istrative burdens just started
 1 (see also the table below). 
The fourth report (1996) noted that a similar pattern was emerging in the re-
sponses at a national level to the problem of administrative burdens. Most 
countries had established a committee to analyse the status quo, and to make 
recommendations on how and where burdens could be reduced. Most had 
also taken the ‘first steps’ of introducing systems to review proposals for new 
legislation and of modifying the systems for collecting taxation. The fifth re-
port (1997) confirmed this picture. In the period 1996-1997, in almost all Mem-
ber States, with the exception of Greece and Iceland, actions to reduce the 
compliance cost for information transfer for business, in the various European 
countries, were undertaken or being planned to be undertaken. 
 
1   EIM, The European Observatory for SMEs, Third Annual Report, Theme Study Administrative 
Burdens, chapter 14, EIM, the Netherlands, Zoetermeer. EIM Business & Policy Research    31 
Strategies, policies and measures to reduce administrative burdens in the different European countries 
    Strategies, policies and measures to reduce administrative burdens 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A u s t r i a  XX XX X
Belgium X X X
D e n m a r k  XXXXXX
Finland X X X
France X X X X X X
Germany X X X
Greece X X X
I r e l a n d  XXX
Italy X X
Luxembourg X X X X
Netherlands X X X X X X
Norway X X X X
Portugal X X X X X
Spain X X
Sweden X X X
United Kingdom  X X X X X X X
Notes: 
1. Research.  5. Special rules for SMEs. 
2. Information and advice.  6. Replacement of existing laws. 
3. Forms and reporting requirements.  7. Possible burdens connected with new legislation. 
4. Administrative procedures. 
Source: EIM, The European Observatory for SMEs (1995), Third Annual Report, Theme Study Administra-
tive Burdens, chapter 14, EIM, the Netherlands, Zoetermeer. 
It would be inopportune, in this context, to discuss the situation in each sepa-
rate Member State in much more detail. For illustration purposes, the discus-
sion will however be limited to the case of the United Kingdom. In a later 
stage in this report, special attention will be paid to the Netherlands. 
Deregulation has been receiving considerable attention for quite some time in 
the United Kingdom (since the Thatcher period). However, the United King-
dom has no autonomous policy concerning compliance costs for information 
transfer.
1  
The Deregulation Unit of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was the 
one responsible for the development and co-ordination of the deregulation 
policy. Generally, each Department in the United Kingdom has its own unit for 
Deregulation (DDU). The role played by the DTI is comparable with the co-
ordinating function of the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs for the 
 
1   I.Th.M. Snellen, Report Visit to the UK, on behalf of the Commissie Administratieve Lasten, 15 
July 1999,  The Hague.  
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Market Deregulation and Legislation Quality project (MDW-project). More 
about this subject later on. 
The Deregulation Unit of the DTI was transferred to the Cabinet Office by the 
Major Government, where this unit developed a Compliance Cost Assessment 
(CCA) and a Regulatory Appraisal (RA). A CCA is a method being developed to 
ensure a rough but systematic estimate, in broad lines, of the anticipated 
compliance costs for business, should there be new or amended regulations. 
Departments are expected to execute the CCA as policy proposal, which ac-
cording to expectations will have consequences for business. The RA pays spe-
cific attention to the anticipated benefit of new or amended regulations. 
The Blair government has taken over this part of the Major government’s pol-
icy. The reduction of superfluous regulation is one of the priorities in the 
Blair/Schröder Manifesto.
1 The Blair government has replaced the Deregula-
tion Units with Better Regulation Units, and, consequently, the CCA and the 
RA with Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), which simultaneously attempts 
to map out the costs and benefits of regulations.
2 In the mean time, the name 
of the Better Regulation Units has been changed to Regulatory Impact Unit. In 
addition, the Blair government has also established a Better Regulation Task 
Force (BRTF). This is a watchdog outside the government. It is a Quango (quasi 
autonomous non-governmental organisation), a private organisation that ful-
fils a government function almost autonomously. The BRTF pays particular at-
tention to the transparency, proportionality, objectivity and consistency of re-
gulation. The BRTF also monitors the way in which the government fulfils its 
responsibilities to its citizens and to business.
3 
OECD 
Even in many other OECD countries, there is an increasing consciousness of 
regulatory costs for business, including the transfer of information compliance 
costs. The following excerpt illustrates that ‘Improving the empirical basis for 
regulatory decisions through impact analysis of new regulatory proposals is a 
popular reform strategy in OECD countries. By 1996, more than half of the 
OECD countries had adopted Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) programmes, up 
from one or two in 1980, and an increasing proportion of laws and other regu-
lations affecting citizens (and businesses) are being shaped in part by various 
 
1  For example: ‘We should make it easy for individuals to set up businesses and for new compa-
nies to grow by lightening administrative burdens, exempting small businesses from onerous 
regulations’, and Quotation from the Blair/Schröder Manifesto, Europe: The Third Way/Die 
Neue Mitte, The Amsterdam Post, 11 June 1999. 
2   Better Regulation Task Force, Annual Report 1997/1998, UK, September 1998, p. 2. 
3   For more information about BRTF, see Better Regulation Task Force, Annual Report 1997/1998, 
Cabinet Office, London, September 1998. EIM Business & Policy Research    33 
forms of RIA. In 1995, governments in all OECD countries agreed to use tech-
niques such as RIA to improve the quality of new regulations.’
1 
The Netherlands 
The ‘Extensive operations’ 
In the Netherlands, the process of regulation was strengthened by the reces-
sions in the Seventies and beginning of the Eighties, which led to the ‘crisis’ in 
the Dutch constitutional state. This resulted in a political climate in which the 
role of the public sector within the economy became the subject of discussion. 
Discussions about the size of the public sector and the increasing complexity of 
regulation resulted in the conclusion that business was subject to substantial 
regulation. Deregulation then became an explicit political objective, and there 
was consensus on the opinion that the size of the public sector had to be re-
duced.
2 The Eighties were also the years of ‘extensive operations’, such as 
those to improve government organisation at national level, undertaken by 
the government itself.
3 
This involved the reorganisation of the civil service, decentralisation, privatisa-
tion and trimming down the government machine.
4 These operations were 
continued later in a slightly different form under the heading of extensive ef-
ficiency operations, social renewal, etc. At the same time, the Cabinet also 
made a contribution under the motto of statesmanship, governmental and 
constitutional renewal under the lead of the Deetman Committee. 
Committees aiming at simplifying the regulations governing information 
transfer 
In the Eighties and beginning of the Nineties, the establishment of three Gov-
ernment Committees greatly stimulated consciousness of the phenomenon of 
the cost of complying with information transfer regulations among policy 
makers. These government committees were assigned to submit proposals to 
simplify the information transfer regulations for individuals and businesses. 
The emphasis for the three committees was on fiscal information regulations, 
tax on wages and other income, and associated obligations in the field of na-
tional insurance and occupational insurance. 
The first committee, the committee with the assignment to lighten administra-
tive burdens for businesses, was installed on 12 April 1984 and named after its 
 
1   OECD, Regulatory Impact Analysis, Best Practices in OECD Countries, 1997, p. 13. 
2   M. Allers, op. cit., 1994, p. 11. 
3   For more information about the ‘Extensive operations’, see F.K.M. van Nispen and P. Noord-
hoek (red.), De grote operaties, Deventer, 1986, en C.A. de Kam, J. de Haan, Terugtredende 
Overheid: realiteit of retoriek? Schoonhoven, 1991. 
4   P. de Haan, Th. Drupsteen and R. Fernhout, Bestuursrecht in de Sociale Rechtstaat, deel I, 
Ontwikkeling, Organisatie, Instrumentarium, Kluwer, Deventer, 1996, p. 189.  
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chairman - the Grapperhaus Committee. The Grapperhaus Committee was oc-
cupied mainly with regulations applying to information compliance in the 
field of social insurance and tax legislation and had been instructed to submit 
concrete proposals to reduce the compliance costs of information transfer 
regulations. In 1985, the Grapperhaus Committee submitted its final report ti-
tled Heerendiensten
1. 
The title of this report refers to the concept of the Feudal Services relating to 
the Middle Ages whereby services were provided to the Feudal Lord without 
receiving payment. The above committee described the political climate of 
1985 in the Netherlands as follows ‘… Trying to make more structural changes 
to society in the Netherlands is like trying to demolish the Chinese Wall with a 
sledge hammer …’. 
The chairman of the committee also indicates that he has little faith in the ex-
tent to which the problem of information transfer compliance costs is recog-
nised by politicians. He added ‘In my eyes the tendency in Dutch society to 
regulate everything down to the smallest detail, thus creating a situation in 
which complexity and obscurity prevail, seems to be founded on an un-
quenchable thirst for equality and justice’. 
The committee distinguished in her recommendations two types of informa-
tion obligation transfers, (1) partial information transfer by businesses con-
cerning a specific part of an operational process such as the calculation of the 
annual loss/profit, and (2) information transfer concerning non-operational 
processes such as information on the wage tax and social premiums. 
The compliance with the second category is considered by the committee to be 
a government tax levied in kind, because otherwise this information will not 
be compiled. The committee also questioned the legal foundation of such 
regulations. The fact that the time was not yet ripe for real changes was ap-
parent from the Cabinet’s reaction one year after the publication of the com-
mittee’s recommendations (1986)
2. In general, many parties felt that the reac-
tion of the Cabinet in this respect was conservative, lax and disappointing. 
In September 1985, a committee was inaugurated specifically to simplify in-
come tax. The committee was named after its chairman the Oort Committee. 
This committee produced its final report in May 1986, ‘Perception of simplic-
ity’. In its proposals, the committee aimed to lighten the information compli-
ance regulations applying to tax payers (both employees and unemployed per-
sons), tax leviers (businesses/social funds) and the tax authorities. The commit-
tee made recommendations aiming to reduce the complexity of the regula-
 
1   Committee to lighten administrative burdens for businesses, Heerendiensten (Feudal Service); 
preface and summary of part 1 and part 2-7, Government Publications The Hague, 28 June 
1985. 
2   Regeringsstandpunt inzake de aanbevelingen van de Commissie tot Verlichting van de Admi-
nIstratieve Verplichtingen voor het Bedrijfsleven, August 1986. EIM Business & Policy Research    35 
tions themselves, and not specifically on the accompanying complicated pro-
cedures and forms. 
In April 1990, the Stevens Committee, a third committee working in the same 
field of tax reform, was appointed. Her first report
1 was published in July 1991. 
This committee was instructed to concentrate on three elements: (1) reducing 
wage tax, (2) reducing income tax through expanding the base of the levying, 
and (3) simplifying the base of levying tax. 
The proposals to reduce information obligations of firms emphasise particu-
larly a single levying of social premiums and wage tax following a single 
method, by a single institution and, finally, in accordance with a single proce-
dure for objections and appeals. 
These proposals encountered strong opposition by the executing bodies re-
sponsible for employees’ insurances. The social debate on this subject has now 
lasted for about ten years. In 1999, the second Kok Cabinet decided in favour 
of continuing the existing situation. The Committee’s proposal was rejected. 
Operation Market, Deregulation and Legislation Quality  
The operation Market, Deregulation and Legislation Quality (MDW) was initi-
ated by the first Kok Cabinet.
2 Deregulation, as part of the MDW operation, 
aimed at lessening and simplifying government regulations. Reducing infor-
mation transfer compliance costs for businesses was one of its priorities
3. One 
of the tools being made available for the operation was the Legislation Test of 
1985 (Wetgevingstoets). The tool served to test new legislation in terms of le-
gitimacy, effectiveness, feasibility, simplicity and the extent of compliance 
costs for businesses as well as  administrative costs for executing institutions. 
This general test consists of several parts. One is the Business Impact Test (BET) 
which examines, among others, the compliance costs for businesses with new 
or amended legislation. The intention was that the BET would be applied by 
each department whenever there was new or amended legislation. However, 
in practice, only modest use has been made of this possibility, due to, among 
others, the parliament’s rejection of the van Erp Motion which proposed to 
impose the utilization of the BET to determine the cost of complying with in-
formation transfer for every new law or amendment. 
The Administrative Burdens Committee 
The Slechte Committee, named after its chairman Mr. Slechte, was appointed 
on 27 November 1998, to give a strong incentive to policy making in the field 
 
1   Graag of niet, Verlaging, Vereenvoudiging, Verbreding, Rapport van de Commissie voor de Be-
lastingherziening, Sdu Juridische & Fiscale Uitgeverij, The Hague, July 1991. 
2   P. de Haan, op. cit., 1996, p. 189. 
3   Tweede Kamer, 24 036, nr. 5.  
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of administrative burdens reduction
1. The appointment of this committee led 
to the thread - that had been broken by the discouraging attitude of the 
Cabinet towards the recommendation of the Grapperhaus Committee in 
1986 - being picked up again. Both the Slechte Committee as well as the 
Grapperhaus Committee, specifically, addressed the subject of reducing the in-
formation transfer compliance costs for businesses. It is remarkable that, with 
the appointment of the Slechte Commissie, attention was paid for the first 
time to the costs of complying with information transfer regulations in areas 
other than tax legislation and social insurance. In principle, the Slechte Com-
mittee did not exclude any type of information regulation, neither did it ex-
clude it for other authorities, such as provinces and local councils. 
The terms of reference of the Slechte Committee show that it appears that a 
lesson has been learnt from the disappointing experience concerning the inef-
fectiveness of the policy aimed at reducing the regulation of information 
transfer since the time of the Grapperhaus Committee. According to Article 3, 
item 1, the brief of the Committee is to provide the Minister with advice on 
the subject of MDW (Market, Deregulation and Legislation quality) to achieve 
a substantial reduction in the administrative burdens for business, and to im-
prove the involvement of business as a whole in the compilation and execu-
tion of new legislation and regulation, insofar as legislation and regulation 
apply to business
2. 
On 25 November 1999, the Slechte Committee submitted its final report 
(Regulations without inconvenience). The Slechte Commission bases its rec-
ommendations on a basic philosophy resting on three instruments: erosion of 
legitimacy, integral or individual checks of information transfer compliance 
costs, and responsibility and counter force. 
Erosion of legitimacy refers to the Committee’s fear that the increasing costs 
of information transfer compliance could lead to the erosion of the legitimacy 
of the legislation itself. By integral or individual checks, the Committee indi-
cates that they, when taking initiatives to control information transfer compli-
ance costs, plead for the question as to whether the government is doing the 
right things (this is mainly a political query) to be kept separate from the ques-
tion of whether the government is doing things in the right way (information 
logistics). 
Finally, responsibility and counter force whereby the Committee refers to the 
desirability of a change in culture by government institutions themselves 
(more character by accepting self-responsibility for the quality and efficiency 
of the demand for information) in combination with the establishment of an 
 
1   ‘Instellingsregeling Commissie Administratieve Lasten’, 27 November 1998/nr. 98069082 
WJA/W, Staatscourant 1998, nr. 232, p. 9. 
2  Regulation without inconvenience; lesser, simpler, more efficient, Final report of the Commis-
sie Administratieve Lasten, Annex 1a, page VIII, The Hague, 25 November 1999. EIM Business & Policy Research    37 
independent body, at a distance from the governmental organisation itself, 
that monitors and approaches the one primarily responsible for the demand 
for information (counter force).  
The recommendations of the Slechte Committee had a favourable reception 
from the Cabinet. The Cabinet has stated that it will support the framework 
and will examine and work out the policy guidelines sketched by the Commit-
tee and, where necessary, crystallise its reaction to the final report
1. So now 
the tide seems to have turned. The time is now ripe to take effective measures 
to reduce the cost of complying with information transfer regulations. 
2.5 Effective  policy  measures 
General 
Until 1994, neither the Netherlands nor other countries were in Pope’s fourth 
and fifth stages, taking effective policy measures and monitoring. Allers (1994) 
refers to this as follows: ‘All in all, we must conclude that, although policy rec-
ognition has been on the increase lately, the last two phases of Pope, i.e. im-
plementing effective policy measures and continual monitoring of operating 
costs, have not yet been reached in the Netherlands nor indeed in any other 
country’
2. This situation changed in the second half of the Nineties. Policy mak-
ing applying to the field of information transfer compliance costs started to 
improve and has become adapted for action. One important reason for this is, 
presumably, that in the first half of the Nineties the result of surveys carried 
out into the quantifying of the extent of the costs of complying with informa-
tion transfer resulted in a shock effect among politicians in the various coun-
tries. Probably, new possibilities in the field of ITC have also played a positive 
part in the realisation of effective policy measures. 
OECD 
A study carried out in 1998 in nine countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, England, Norway, the United States, Sweden and New Zealand) has 
assessed several projects in the field of ICT and administrative burdens. This 
study has resulted in the identification of 56 projects all having the same ob-
jective, namely to reduce the costs of information transfer compliance for 
businesses
3. Most of these projects were based on electronic data exchange, 
pro-active service (e.g. one counter), unique identification number, authentic 
 
1  Letter to the Chairman of the Second Chamber of the Dutch Staten-Generaal, ref. ES/MDW 
99067227, 20 oktober 1999, and 00009455, 11 February 2000. 
2   M. Allers, op. cit., 1994, p. 13. 
3  Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Eindrapport ‘ICT en administratieve lasten’,  The Hague, 12 
November 1998.  
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data management and basic registration. This study showed that there are 
significant similarities in the ideas and initiatives developed in the field. 
For the purpose of illustration, a number of examples of policy measures, be-
ing taken currently in OECD countries, are given below.
1 
In the United Kingdom the following initiatives have been taken to reduce in-
formation compliance costs by using ITC. These are mainly important for small 
businesses: 
•  Direct Access Government is a ‘one-stop shop’ or a ‘single counter’ facility 
for businesses. A project initiated by the Cabinet office to offer entrepre-
neurs the opportunity to use inter-active forms to be completed and sub-
mitted through the Internet. 
•  The Small Business Service, a project managed by the DTI (Department of 
Trade and Industry) since May 1, 1999. This initiative aims to give the small-
scale entrepreneur a say within the government. Possibly, this service will 
become a ‘single electronic gateway’ for small businesses. The service be-
came operational in November 1999. It is expected that, possibly, this ser-
vice will take over the above-mentioned one (Direct Access Government). 
•  The INFOSHOP, a pilot project at local level aiming at providing enterprises 
with a review of all the applicable variations of legislation and measures 
applying in the region through a single window. Many laws made by cen-
tral government are implemented at local or regional level in the United 
Kingdom. 
In Denmark, the following ICT applications aiming to reduce the cost of infor-
mation compliance are worth mentioning:  
•  Within the Ministry of Trade and Industry a special agency is responsible for 
reducing the costs of information transfer compliance, this is the Ehrvervs- 
og Selskabsstyrelsen. This Agency is assigned to copy all governmental 
forms onto the Internet. In due course, this is expected to lead to a certain 
amount of unification. 
•  Ideas are being developed to offer small businesses the possibility to out-
source to administration offices all contacts with the government involving 
the exchange of information and the accompanying legal obligations. 
Finally, in Norway, there is a Central Co-ordinating Register of Legal Entities 
Bronnoysundregistrene, which exists since 1980 and aims at reducing compli-
ance costs. 
This Register is an agency belonging to the Ministry of Justice and manages 
registers for various other ministries. The objective of the agency is to promote 
trustworthy relationships in society. One of the agency’s responsibilities is to 
 
1  Information taken from country reports, reports of fact-finding missions which Prof. I.Th. 
Sneelen has compiled on the instructions of the Committee for administrative burdens. These 
refer to the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, July-
September 1999. EIM Business & Policy Research    39 
encourage efficiency in the traffic between the public and private sector and 
to avoid the same information being stored many times. In 1997, a new Regis-
ter of Administrative Regulations was established to contain a record of all 
forms that regulate the traffic between businesses and the Government. The 
legal tasks of this register are to co-ordinate existing and new information 
regulations, act as an information centre for business and government, organ-
ise hearings for the legislator and also to work out definitions for data collec-
tion by public authorities. 
The Netherlands 
One of the first definite initiatives, aiming at the reduction of the costs of 
complying with information transfer regulations in the Netherlands, was the 
establishment of the Foundation for Enlightening Administrative Burdens of 
Small and Medium-Sized Businesses (Stichting Administratieve Lastenverlicht-
ing Midden- en Kleinbedrijf, SALM) in 1990. The initiative was a combined 
venture involving the association of entrepreneurs, enforcement authorities, 
the business community and the government (the Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs). SALM was mainly preoccupied with the reorganisation of the infrastruc-
ture for information transfer between businesses and enforcement agencies 
by external integration. Electronic data and one central collection point were 
major key words for this initiative. 
Another significant initiative was the appointment of the van Lunteren Com-
mittee in 1994, a committee named after its chairman, the Director-General of 
the Taxation Authorities. The objective of the committee was to reduce the 
compliance costs of information transfer in the field of taxation. The initiative 
was taken by the Ministry of Finance to create a platform for structural discus-
sions between the Ministry and business associations. The subject of discussion 
was the execution models of information transfer regulations in the field of 
taxation. So, it was not taxation itself that was under discussion but the 
method by which taxes were levied. In 1995, this committee was converted by 
the Secretary of State for Finance into a permanent consultative body for the 
business organisations and the Tax authorities. One of the items placed on the 
agenda of this consultative body concerned the development of a tool to mea-
sure the costs of complying with fiscal information transfer regulations for 
businesses, the Standaardkostenmodel Fiscale Verplichtingen
1 (Model of the 
Standard Cost of Tax Regulation), developed by EIM as a special module of 
MISTRAL (Measuring InSTRument Administrative Loads). 
The statement of the first Kok Cabinet, during its government period 1994-
1998, to reduce the costs of information transfer compliance for business by 
10% had a significant impact on policy making in the Netherlands. The Minis-
 
1   Reducing administrative costs for businesses. Final report of the Committee for the reduction 
of administrative regulations for business, Ministry of Finance, The Hague, October 1995, p. 3 
of the State Secretary’s letter of 12 October 1995.  
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try of Economic Affairs was (and still is) responsible for co-ordinating the ac-
tions required to achieve this goal. The Cabinet regularly informed the Lower 
House about the progress and results of this policy.
1 During the period 1994-
1998 a total of 69 definite amendments were made to the legislative regula-
tions concerning information transfer from businesses to the government. The 
majority of these amendments originated from the explicit objective to reduce 
compliance costs by 10%
2. Also the second Kok Cabinet has decided to reduce 
the information transfer compliance costs by another 15% during its second 
period in government. 
In 1998 there were about 53 projects with common goal to reduce informa-
tion transfer compliance costs by using ICT.
3 Most of these projects were based 
on electronic data exchange, pro-active service (e.g. one counter), unique 
identification number, authentic data management and basic registration. 
2.6 Monitoring 
General  
By monitoring we mean following the annual developments of the compliance 
costs of information transfer systematically and in separate fields of legisla-
tion. This is the area where the situation in the Netherlands differs from the 
United States. In the US, monitoring is more general in nature. 
So far, the available literature suggests that Pope’s final phase - monitoring 
the administrative burdens - has been reached only in the Netherlands and to 
a lesser extent in the United States. 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the initial results on the subject of monitoring the costs of 
complying with information transfer regulations appeared in 1999; these cov-
ered the period 1993-1998. In the future, there will be an annual report of the 
developments in information transfer compliance costs for Dutch businesses.
4  
 
1   Lower House, Towards fewer administrative burdens, 27 June 1995; Lower House, Progress in 
the reduction of administrative burdens for businesses, 14 July 1997; Lower House, Present 
state of affairs of the project to reduce administrative burdens, 14 April 1998; Lower House, 
Report of general discussions on the lightening of administrative burdens for businesses, 26 
August 1998. 
2   J.J. Boog and others, Monitoring Administrative Burdens for Businesses; Checking the objective 
of the first ‘Purple’ government, EIM, Zoetermeer 1999, p. 37. 
3   H. van der Zijden and others, Final report ‘ICT and administrative burdens’, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, The Hague, 12 November 1998. 
4   J.J. Boog and others, op. cit., 1999. EIM Business & Policy Research    41 
United States 
In the United States attempts are being made to monitor the entire costs of 
regulation for businesses. Information transfer compliance costs are an espe-
cially recognisable part. These costs are measured in hours. As far as is known 
there are data available for the period 1977-1998.
1 
2.7 Summary 
More than 200 years passed after Pope’s first phase, consciousness of profes-
sionals, before the final phase, monitoring, was reached. The table below 
shows the total overview. The periods cannot be distinguished exactly - there 
is some overlapping. 
Phases of growing consciousness of the costs of information transfer compliance 
Phase  Period* 
Recognition by professionals  ± 1750 - ± 1935 
Quantification  ± 1935 - ± 1995 
Recognition by politicians  ± 1985 - ± 1995 
Effective policy measures  From 1990  
Monitoring  From 1999** 
*  The period stated is approximate. 
**  Only in the Netherlands and, to a lesser degree, in the US. 
It is striking that recognition by politicians has taken so long: approximately 60 
years after the initial quantification of the cost of complying with information 
transfer requirements. From that time onwards, more attention has been paid 
to this issue. This development could be explained by at least five reasons. 
One is the density of regulations. The extent of social regulations to protect 
consumers, employees and the environment increased significantly in the last 
ten years or so. Previously, information regulation was more economic and 
general in nature, especially taxation was dominant. 
Another reason is the increasing interest of politicians to enhance the use of 
information technology in reducing compliance costs. 
A third reason is the fast development of communication technology. 
A fourth reason entails the pulling-back behaviour of governments as a result 
of growing democratisation. 
A fifth reason is the globalisation and accompanied world-wide competition. 
 
1   Thomas D. Hopkins, ‘The Costs of Federal Regulation’, in: Journal of Regulation and Social 
Costs, Vol. 2, No. I, March 1992, pp. 5-31; up-dated data appear in Regulatory Costs in Profile, 
Policy Study No. 132, centre for the Study of American Businesses, Washington University, St. 
Louis, Missouri, August 1996.  
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3 Theoretical  framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of the theoretical background of in-
formation processing imposed on businesses and the resulted information 
transfer compliance costs. 
For this purpose, a theoretical model, which explains the emergence of infor-
mation obligation and compliance costs, has been developed. The chapter 
starts with explaining the general structure of the model and treats the four 
instruments of the model, namely: elections/business lobby, legislation, steer-
ing and design. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the way businesses per-
ceive and accept the information transfer obligations and related psychologi-
cal (irritation) burdens. 
An examination of the determinants of information transfer compliance costs 
concludes this chapter. 
3.2  Theoretical model for information transfer regulations and com-
pliance costs 
3.2.1 Introduction 
When businesses are obliged to comply with the regulations governing the 
transfer of information, this leads to compliance costs. Important questions in 
this respect are: Where does this information transfer regulation come from? 
What is its origin? How is it legitimised? How is it designed and how enforced?  
To answer these questions, a theoretical model, within which the information 
transfer regulations themselves have been integrated, is developed. In this 
model, relevant insights on the position and nature of the determinants of the 
costs of complying with information transfer regulations are provided (see 
page 44 for a diagram of the model). The cohesion in the model between the 
several components will be discussed and explained, but in general terms. 
The regulations governing the transfer of information for businesses and the 
cost of complying with these regulations is the main subject of this report. To 
be able to present a complete picture of the relevant cohesion in the model it 
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3.2.2 Actors  and  instruments 
Five interconnected actors form the skeleton of the theoretical model. The 
first two individual actors are citizens and business companies; they operate 
within the private domain. Two other actors are parliament and government, 
both positioned in the public domain. Finally, there are the institutions which 
operate partly in the public domain, for example the Tax Authorities, and 
partly in the private domain, e.g. Labour Circumstances Authorities. 
The individual actors have, as far as information transfer regulations are con-
cerned, a mutual structural relationship. These structural relationships are 
maintained through the instruments utilised in this model. The contacts be-
tween civilians/businesses and parliament are mainly realised through the in-
strument  election/business lobby. Parliament and government interact 
through the instrument legislation. The government maintains contact with 
institutions through the steering instrument. Last but not least, the relation-
ship between the institutions and businesses or civilians is maintained through 
the design instrument of the information transfer regulations. Citizens and 
businesses have therefore their role to play, at the beginning of the process 
they have the right to state their preferences by way of elections or business 
lobby, while at the end of the process they have the duty to comply with in-
formation transfer regulations. 
At the beginning of the process of regulating information transfer, citizens 
have in a democratic state the right to speak so as to determine the social val-
ues that they may consider important. Similarly, at the end of the process, 
these persons have to be obedient and co-operate in the execution of the 
government policy and comply with the laws and other regulations
1. 
Instrument 1: Elections/business lobby 
Citizens have personal preferences with respect to social values such as safety, 
environment, labour conditions, health, social security and equity. Citizens in-
dicate social preferences at the elections by voting for the political party 
whose programme corresponds best to their preferences. In an ideal situation, 
the elected parliament, actor 2, is then a reflection of the sum of the individ-
ual preferences of those citizens who have made use of their right to vote. The 
relationship between citizens and parliament comes into being via the elec-
tion instrument. 
Noticeable is that businesses, being legal entities, have no personal role to 
play within the  instrument of elections. Of course, businesses are private co-
 
1  A. Hoogerwerf, M.J. Arentsen, P.J. Kok. For acceptable policy; A Study of the social acceptation 
of government policy. Centre for Social Administration Research and Education, Faculty of So-
cial Administration, University of Twente, Enschede, January 1993.  
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operations of citizens, but have as such no voting rights, because that is a per-
sonal privilege. 
However, the involvement of citizens in businesses can take many forms and 
may vary from extremely strong involvement to no involvement at all. A citi-
zen could, for example, be the director-owner of a company but he could also 
be a shareholder or manager. In addition, a citizen could be an (ex-)employee, 
customer or supplier of a business. The ultimate form of involvement is the in-
dependent entrepreneur who, as a private person, runs a business without cor-
porate rights. 
For self-employed the role of citizen and business merges. In western social 
constitutional states, most citizens have, either directly or indirectly, some sort 
of relationship with one or more companies. Many citizens are also stake-
holders. This implies that preferences of individual citizens are always repre-
sented, to some extent, in individual companies. Naturally, this does not apply 
to the same extent for all citizens and all businesses. It is also common practice 
that organised business uses political lobbies to make its preferences known to 
members of parliament. For that reason, we added business lobby as a sepa-
rate element to instrument 1. The preferences of organised business circles are 
not always identical to the preferences of citizens. Mostly, the business lobby 
tries to mitigate the policy effects of preferences of citizens. For the rest, busi-
nesses are prepared to accept social responsibility more and more.
1 
Instrument 2: Legislation 
Parliament, actor 2, sets social goals and objectives taking into account the 
preferences expressed by the majority electorate. The ‘contrat social’ is agreed 
in parliament and the citizen transfers part of his/her individual rights to col-
lectivisation. Parliament passes the responsibility for executing these policies 
to the government, actor 3. The government then compiles laws and regula-
tions, the determination of norms and values in behavioural patterns, which 
will regulate the behaviour of the citizens in such a way that the specified 
goals and objectives can be achieved. In addition to  the determination of be-
havioural patterns, the legitimisation of legislation is essential, not only in the 
relationship between parliament and the government (formal legitimisation), 
but certainly in the relationship between government/institutions and citi-
zens/businesses (legitimisation of content). 
The government draws up a budget to finance all the relevant activities re-
quired to achieve these objectives. Parliament supervises by either approving 
or rejecting proposed legislation and regulations and the budget itself. The re-
lationship between parliament and the government comes into being primar-
ily through the process of legislation, instrument 2. 
 
1  H. Noordegraaf, J. van Workum (red.), Maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen; een 
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Instrument 3: Steering 
The government, actor 3, chooses the suitable policy instruments for achieving 
its social objectives. In principle, the government has a choice out of three 
steering models to influence the behaviour of the citizens and businesses: the 
communicative model (persuasion), the economic model (subsidy) and the le-
gal model (enforcement). For each type of steering model, there is a specific 
type of institution, actor 4, which is responsible for the execution of the law or 
regulation applying to behavioural control (with respect to obligations). 
Agreements are made between the government and the institutes to defray 
the institutes’ execution costs. These costs incurred by the institutes are, in 
principle, an item in the National Budget (on-budget). An exception to this 
rule is the (privatised) institutes, which operate outside the public domain, for 
example the Labour Circumstances Authorities. Here, the cost is borne by busi-
nesses (off-budget), which are legally obliged to be associated with such an 
authority. For businesses these are the costs of complying with legislation and 
regulations. The relationship between the government and the institutes is 
governed by instrument 3, the choice of steering models. 
Instrument 4: Design 
Actor 4, the institute, applies the chosen instrument to businesses (actor 5), 
and to civilians (actor 1). Regulations are imposed on both businesses and citi-
zens to steer social behaviour in the desired direction. As soon as the institute 
wishes to be informed about the effects of this behavioural manipulation, 
then the aspect of the obligation of businesses or citizens to transfer informa-
tion comes into picture. Whenever monitoring the ‘content’ of the obligation 
is involved, the institutes enforce the transfer of information obligations. Such 
transfer of information obligations enforced by the institutes result in infor-
mation transfer compliance costs for businesses. From the point of view of 
business both endogenous and exogenous determinants play a part in deter-
mining the extent of the  information compliance costs. 
In addition to the actual cost of complying with information transfer regula-
tions, the psychological costs are also significant. These are determined to a 
great extent by business’ degree of acceptance of the information transfer 
regulations. The nature of the relationship between the institutes and citi-
zens/businesses, which ensues from this obligation to transfer information, is 
determined via instrument 4, the design of the information transfer regula-
tions. 
3.2.3  Data flow as feedback 
The relationships described in the model begin by actor 1 (the citizen) and 
proceed through parliament (actor 2) to the government (actor 3). The gov-
ernment gives instructions to the institutes (actor 4) that impose regulations 
on businesses (actor 5) and citizens (actor 1). Then the circular flow is round.  
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The objective of the processes set in course is to enforce/ensure the required 
social behaviour. 
For the actors in the public domain it is essential to have access to information 
about the extent of compliance by businesses and citizens in the private do-
main with the socially desired behaviour. The actors in the public domain need 
this information to be able to assess whether the required objectives have 
been achieved or not, and, if not, to what extent they need to be adjusted. In 
the model, the flow of information concerning the compliance with legislation 
and regulation is shown by arrows marked information, which move counter-
clockwise. The flow starts by the one who is deemed to comply with the in-
formation transfer regulations, the businesses and citizens, and ends at the 
citizen. The conclusion of the ‘contrat social’ should be that the citizen is in-
formed about the effectiveness of collectivisation. What has he/she received in 
return for sacrificing part of his/her personal freedom to collectivisation? To 
what extent have the desired social objectives - good social security, good 
health care, the fair distribution of income, etc. actually been achieved? 
The transfer of information from businesses to the institutions, and the ac-
companying compliance costs, form the core of this study. Information ex-
change concerns the reports of individual businesses to the institutes. Gov-
ernment funds the compliance costs of neither businesses nor citizens, anyway. 
Compliance costs of businesses and citizens are no part of the National 
Budget. That’s why we call them ‘off-budget’ costs. Other information flows 
- from the institutes to the government, from the government to parliament 
and from the parliament to the electorate - are in principle the responsibility 
of the National Budget (‘on-budget’). The latter information flows and related 
on-budget costs will not be dealt with further. 
3.2.4 Summary 
The theoretical framework relies on two main relevant processes. One relates 
to the process whereby individual preferences of citizens and businesses are 
transformed into social values, norms and behavioural rules, and the obliga-
tion to adhere to these rules. Another is the process whereby citizens and 
businesses are obliged to transfer information relating to their behaviour. 
These two processes run in opposite directions but both start with the citizens 
i.e. businesses. 
The theoretical model has five actors. Citizens and businesses are operating 
within the private domain, parliament and government within the public do-
main, and, finally, the implementing institutions, which might be active within 
both domains, private and public. 
The actors are bound to each other by contact, through several instruments. 
There are four instruments, namely: elections (business lobby for businesses), 
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•  Elections (business lobby) determine the relationship between the citi-
zens/businesses and the parliament. 
•  Parliament and government interact with each other through the instru-
ment of legislation. 
•  The steering instrument enables the government and institutions to be in 
close contact. 
•  The design instrument (of both content and the obligation to transfer in-
formation) determines the relationship between the institutions and busi-
ness i.e. citizens. 
Each of these instruments has its own specific impact on the transfer of infor-
mation obligations imposed on businesses and, subsequently, the accompany-
ing compliance costs. 
3.3  The four instruments 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In this paragraph, detailed information will be given about the four instru-
ments - election/business lobby, legislation, steering and design. The idea be-
hind this model is that each of the four instruments has an impact on the de-
terminants of the information transfer compliance costs. The effect of legisla-
tion/business lobby on the extent of information transfer compliance costs, for 
example, is indirect, and works through the other three instruments. From the 
instrument design, in the model, there is a sort of cumulative direct effect on 
the information transfer compliance costs. The indirect effects of the first 
three instruments - legislation/business lobby, legislation and steering - are 
added to the direct effect of design on the information transfer compliance 
costs. 
3.3.2   Elections/business lobby 
How and why do citizens come to agree to sacrifice part of their individual 
freedom for collective, national and binding regulations, intended to influ-
ence behaviour, and imposing information transfer on the collective entity?  
According to de Swaan, collectivisation is the basis of this process.
1 The core of 
this collectivisation was the increasing interdependence of the poor and the 
rich. The idea of extending and intensifying human interdependence origi-
nated from the historical sociology of Norbert Elias. In feudal times, the poor 
were both a threat, fear of them attacking possessions of the rich, and a con-
 
1  A. de Swaan, In care of the state, Health care, education and welfare in Europe and the USA in 
the Modern Era, 1988, ref. the Dutch translation, Zorg en Staat; ‘Welzijn, onderwijs en ge-
zondheidszorg in Europa en de Verenigde Staten in de nieuwe tijd, Publisher Bert Bakker, Am-
sterdam, 1993, pp. 224-262. 
  
50    EIM Business & Policy Research 
venience to be used as a labourer or soldier to keep the established order. 
Later, in the era of nationalism and capitalism, the poor were considered 
mainly as a threat to public order, labour unrest, but at the same time, also as 
a reservoir for labour, recruits, consumers and political supporters. Wealthy in-
dividuals were not capable of controlling the external effects. 
The term external effects is taken from Baumol’s Welfare Economy. The indi-
rect consequences that shortages or setbacks affecting the poor could have on 
the wealthy, became ever more threatening as the interdependence between 
rich and poor grew. Therefore, collective action was necessary. However, ex-
ternal effects are difficult to combat using commercial or voluntary agree-
ments, because of the risk of free riders who could benefit without complying, 
as described by Mancur Olson. This created a need for compulsory, national 
and collective welfare arrangements. The obligation to transfer information 
about compliance with the content of the obligation is inherent to such com-
pulsory regulations as one aspect of collectivisation. Only then is it possible to 
have the weapons to combat free riders. 
According to de Swaan, the collectivisation of these ‘welfare arrangements’ 
took place along three axes. First, the scale of these arrangements widened 
from applying locally to applying to the entire nation
1. Secondly, the informal 
collective character of these arrangements changed from informal agreements 
to formal regulations. Finally, the state, or a public body derived from the 
state, gradually developed into being responsible for such arrangements, 
equipped with both the authority to enforce compliance and the bureaucratic 
organisation necessary for the execution. 
De Swaan found that after 1945 there was a hyperbolic expansion of collectiv-
ism, with significant consequences for society. As more and more citizens 
started to participate in such collective arrangements, it became increasingly 
difficult to implement specific economies. There were always influential 
groups who objected. And also a stratum of professional experts and adminis-
trators came into being who needed these collective arrangements to keep 
them in work. They, too, had an interest in maintaining and expanding the 
collective arrangements. Finally, there was a wide-scale change of mentality 
among the citizens living in the constitutional state who began to consider - in 
addition to their physical safety - other items such as health, knowledge and 
guaranteed income to be increasingly important. 
There was also a shift to more self-discipline (savings) and more specific atten-
tion to the future (provisions for old age). Finally, there was a growing aware-
ness of increasing mutual dependence, and with it the transition from paro-
chial charity to social consciousness. To an increasing extent, this social con-
sciousness became linked to an abstract feeling of responsibility that did not 
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encourage personal action, but expected the needy, in general, to be taken 
care of by the state and the public purse. All this was accompanied by an in-
creasing need for information about compliance with the contents of the 
regulations belonging to collectivisation (behavioural changes), but having a 
much wider scope than physical safety and the levying of taxes as was the case 
at the beginning of the collectivisation process. In the post-war era, there was 
a ‘guided economy’ with production taking place in enterprises. Consequently, 
businesses became increasingly involved in complying with information trans-
fer regulations. 
The hyperbolic expansion of collectivisation reached its peak in the 1970s. 
From the Eighties onwards there is evidence of re-thinking of government 
tasks in the form of deregulation and ‘back-to-the-core business’. The welfare 
arrangements were examined from the point of view of the desirability of a 
basic set of provisions in combination with individual responsibilities for more 
extensive provisions. 
An analogy with Maslow’s reasoning about hierarchic sequence - from low to 
high - in the satisfaction of needs is relevant here. The basic physical require-
ments demand private collective actions such as the distribution of employ-
ment and production within enterprises. Meeting other needs such as protec-
tion and safety and the need for (social) security require another type of col-
lective public action together with compulsory regulations. Finally, the need 
for affection and solidarity as well as self-respect and the need to respect oth-
ers require individual action. However, for some, it appears that at the peak of 
the constitutional state collective action is expected to provide for one final 




The relationship between parliament and the government runs via the instru-
ment of legislation. The social objectives, decided upon by majority’s vote in 
parliament, are transferred to the government with instructions to ensure that 
these objectives are achieved. The government has two important instruments 
at its disposition: determining behavioural regulations and legitimising these 
regulations. The establishment of rules of behaviour is based on common law 
in which the government is instructed to provide legislation
2. Legitimisation 
indicates the principle that the power of the government is limited to the au-
thority assigned to it. This paragraph attempts, based on a theoretical model, 
to show the relationship between the legislation instrument on the one hand 
and the obligation to transfer information and the accompanying information 
 
1 A.  Maslow,  Motivation and Personality, Harper & Row, 1970. 
2  P. de Haan, op. cit., p. 8.  
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transfer compliance costs, on the other. The establishment of rules of behav-
iour and legitimisation will be used as aspects of the legislation instrument. 
Establishing rules of behaviour/conduct 
Collectivisation has taken place in areas in which individual objectives can be 
achieved only through collective action. Examples of such areas include good 
social security, a friendly environment, good health care, a good educational 
system and the fair distribution of income, etc. Taken all together, individual 
objectives become social objectives. Collective action requires the regulation of 
behaviour (conduct) through compulsory regulation in order to minimise free 
riding. Such rules of conduct are set down in administrative law. One impor-
tant question is how has administrative law developed, and are there any con-
clusions that can be drawn about the consistency, nature, extent and design of 
information transfer regulations? 
Cohesion with administrative organisation 
The Dutch administrative law came into being as exceptional administrative 
legislation. Due to the lack of a strong central authority, this exceptional legis-
lation originally consisted of regulations compiled by de-centralised bodies. 
Characteristic for each form of administrative law is the cohesion with one cer-
tain administrative organisation. The very limited amount of mutual tun-
ing/consistency of the existing information transfer regulations probably also 
dates from the past. 
In most countries, as in the Netherlands, the first collective actions were in-
tended to provide protection against the threat of physical danger. Taking the 
exceptional natural circumstances in the Netherlands into account - a major 
part of the country is below sea level - the threat of the lower parts of the 
country being flooded was great. Only by using combined and co-ordinated 
efforts would it be possible to combat this threat effectively. The ‘polder mo-
del’, therefore, is an example of one of the first types of collective activities in 
the Netherlands. 
The ‘content’ obligations (rules of behaviour) were laid down in the statutes, 
rules and regulations governing water management. These belong to the old-
est parts of the Dutch administrative legislation. Their history, like that of the 
water boards, dates from the 13
th century. The first charters, giving towns spe-
cial rights and privileges, were also granted in this period. Feudal Law also 
dates from this period. Little is known about the transfer of information obli-
gations at that time. It may be assumed that the most common form of infor-
mation transfer regulation in those days consisted of the fact that when citi-
zens were checked it was compulsory for them to provide information about 
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No comprehensive Law Book  
Originally there were no distinct differences between the types of laws; consti-
tutional, administrative and criminal regulation were all part of one indistinct 
whole. In the 19
th century, the differentiation process in the distribution of au-
thority and the development of law had progressed so far that, for the first 
time, there was talk of administrative law. In Germany, this development was 
based on the Kameralwissenschaften. The Dutch administrative law has been 
influenced by both the developments in Germany and those in France. Dutch 
constitutional law speaks explicitly of regulations based on administrative law. 
This means that, contrary to civil law and criminal law which are regulated in 
the general statutes, no measures are taken to achieve comprehensive codifi-
cation for administrative law. The factual stipulations of Dutch administrative 
law are not contained in one comprehensive Law Book but in a large number 
of individual ‘Special Volumes’. In addition, there is also one ‘General Volume’, 
the main contents of which are abstracts from the ‘Special Volumes’. 
It is not simple to obtain a cohesive review of the Special Volumes of adminis-
trative law. This problem does not apply specifically to the Netherlands. Such a 
review is essential to obtain a clear, integral picture of the areas in which, at 
the present time, collectivisation has led to compulsory regulation both as to 
content and information transfer. Various alternative distinctions are found in 
literature. The most common are: 
•  Classification based on the function of the regulation 
•  Classification based on the subject of the regulation. 
Classifications related to functions make a distinction between economic, so-
cial and general regulation. The function of economic regulation is to protect 
consumers and businesses against financial risks of economic phenomena such 
as monopolies and destructive competition. Economic regulation applies 
mainly to businesses, business processes and the market; for example, maxi-
mum prices, etc. On the contrary, social regulation concentrates on risk reduc-
tion, i.e. it aims to protect consumers, employees and the environment against 
risks which could occur as a consequence of economic business. These could in-
clude health risks for employees and consumers, loss of income, etc. General 
regulation, which is the oldest of the three, deals mainly with subjects such as 
levying taxes, public order and safety, privacy laws, etc. 
Geelhoed mentions the evolution from a national democratic constitution, 
which mainly concentrates on a regulatory function, to a state which, increas-
ingly, concentrates on insurance functions such as in case of social security and 
social care, and performing functions such as in the fields of education and 
physical and technical infrastructure, and, finally, intervening functions such as  
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planning, environment improvement, distribution of income, economic stabil-
ity and growth
1. 
The above evolution from the regulatory state (minimal state) to the insuring, 
performing and intervening state also took place outside the Netherlands in 
Western Europe, but also the USA and many other OECD countries
2. Increas-
ingly over the last two decades, the emphasis of regulatory effects has shifted 
from economic regulation to social regulation. Regulatory concerns dominat-
ing the policy agenda today involve issues such as greenhouse warming, nu-
clear safety, consumer protection, equal opportunity/access for the handi-
capped, job safety, the effect of pollution on health, and more generally envi-
ronmental quality. In the United States, the largest contributor to new regula-
tory costs is environmental regulation
3. 
The relative importance of social regulation will probably increase compared 
to economic regulation. Economic regulation is relatively well embedded in 
society. In many cases, economic regulation will become superfluous, because 
increasing international competition and the development of national econo-
mies has resulted in a market where less governmental regulation will be re-
quired. The need for social regulation, on the contrary, has recently increased 
and will become increasingly important as the social prosperity and the need 
for social protection also grow. The development of a worldwide economy is 
also creating new categories of regulatory problems because effective policy 
applying to climatic changes and the preservation of scarce natural resources 
also implies a worldwide scale of regulation
4. 
The item-related classifications of regulations issuing from administrative law 
apply more to business processes and the treatment of the employee and cus-
tomer within these business processes, as well as the business processes them-
selves. Some examples are: regulations concerning the management of an en-
terprise, regulations in sectors such as construction, transport, mining, but also 
regulations governing intellectual property, public tenders, etc. 
The two classifications related to function or item are, generally speaking, 
easy to combine. 
Positive co-ordination and complicated regulation 
Policy co-ordination in the public sector attempts to find the best possible so-
lution for all relevant interests, this is also called endeavouring to achieve 
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Pareto efficiency. Geelhoed gives an  example of positive co-ordination; an in-
tegral co-ordinated income policy together with an  optimum planning for the 
‘green heart’ and an integral construction policy. 
The more government intervention focuses on objectives and instruments in 
terms of policy and instruments, the greater the positive co-ordination be-
comes. As a consequence, decision making - in parliament and between the 
parliament and the government - in the annual budget cycle is under severe 
pressure by the ex ante assessment of the consequences of these decisions for 
the development and distribution of income. In this way, all sorts of unusual 
policy interventions occur in many areas of legislation in administrative law, 
such as taxation and social security, which also have consequences for informa-
tion transfer obligations for business; the extension of the ‘policy balance’. As 




One important question addresses the subject of the legitimisation of infor-
mation transfer regulations. There is a direct link between the degree of le-
gitimisation of a certain information transfer regulation and the degree to 
which citizens and businesses comply with this regulation. It is therefore im-
portant to make a distinction between legitimisation in the formal sense and 
legitimisation in the  material sense. 
Legitimisation in the formal sense 
The government has power only insofar as it is granted authority. The law 
plays herewith a crucial part. By bestowing this authority, the law allows the 
government to take action but, at the same time, regulates such actions and 
offers citizens (businesses) protection against unregulated government ac-
tions
2. 
The legitimisation of information transfer regulations, in the formal sense, 
originates from administrative law. The administrative law’s functional ap-
proach distinguishes the instrumental function, insurance function and the le-
gitimising function, which is implicit in both previous functions. De Haan con-
siders the legitimising function of administrative law to be the most common. 
If there were no administrative law, the administration would not be empow-
ered to act. This function of administrative law, therefore, has a direct link 
with the constitutional principles of the legality of administration. The legiti-
mising function comes into practice when it establishes administrative bodies, 
grants administrative authority and regulates administrative procedures. 
 
1  L.A. Geelhoed, ‘Legislation and administration in the semi-sovereign state’, in: Interweaving 
and shifting of legislation complexes at the beginning of the 21st century, Staatsrechtkring 
publications, Tjenk Willink, Zwolle, 1996, pp. 13-14. 
2  P. de Haan, p. 21.  
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Unlike the civilian, the government does not have the natural right to perform 
legal actions and to form legal relationships. 
Under administrative law, governmental authorities are, or will be, legiti-
mately allowed to impose information transfer regulations on citizens and 
businesses. In administrative law, the legitimising function of civil law works 
mainly on modification, applied to changes in the status quo, and not on codi-
fication (reflecting social behaviour already developed). The purpose of these 
administrative laws is, in connection with new governmental tasks, to establish 
new administrative organisations, to grant new or adapt existing authority 
and regulating procedures for exerting this authority. 
Legitimisation in the material sense 
Legitimisation in the material sense means that information transfer regula-
tions should be compatible, from society’s point of view, with generally ac-
cepted values. In fact, the objective is to ensure that there is sufficient inter-
nalisation among the citizens, and through them among businesses, to allow 
them to understand that the information transfer regulations are intended to 
achieve social objectives. 
De Haan says in this context that administrative decisions and administrative 
measures should be legitimised in the material sense. In other words, they 
have to comply with the rules of the written and unwritten law. The legitimis-
ing function of administrative law goes beyond setting limits to administrative 
actions. In fact, administrative law aims to justify all the actions of the admini-
stration by setting standards, both as to content and procedures, using rule of 
law
1. 
What is the role of legitimisation, in the  material sense, in the compliance 
with legal information transfer regulations and related compliance costs?  
Literature has much to say about the importance of legitimisation in the  ma-
terial sense. 
Scholten defines legitimacy as the personal conviction to obey persons with 
authority (in specific domains). This personal conviction is based on an individ-
ual perception with respect to these authorities, their behavioural patterns, 
the relevant situation as well as the person’s evaluation of these authorities as 
influenced by personal norms and values
2. 
Potman adds that, besides the legitimacy of these authorities, of flesh and 
blood, as well as of a regime, it is also relevant to speak of legitimacy of a law 
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or policy in general
1. Legitimacy in the practical sense is, therefore, the result 
of a process of legitimisation. Legitimacy involves an attitude. Potman rejects a 
behavioural approach to legitimacy. If a law or policy is accepted as being le-
gitimate, this does not necessarily mean that there is compliance with the ac-
companying regulations. All sorts of other factors, such as anticipated costs 
and benefits of norm-conformist and non-norm-conformist behaviour, are in-
volved in determining the behaviour of individuals. More about this later 
when the instrument design will be discussed. 
Legitimisation of a law or a policy in the  material sense is, according to Pot-
man, not the same as the acceptance of a law or policy. Legitimisation in the 
material sense refers more to a general fundamental attitude towards a law or 
legislation, while acceptance applies much more to the existence, design, con-
tent and effects of such a concrete policy or law. Acceptation will also be dealt 
with when the instrument design is examined. 
Now that we have defined the term ‘legitimisation in the  material sense’, we 
come to the origins from which legitimacy can be derived. Based on literature, 
Potman distinguishes three types of origins for legitimacy. These origins are 
captured through the next questions: Who takes decisions about policies and 
commands? How are these decisions taken? What is the content of the deci-
sion? 
In the case of legitimacy origins, which emphasise from whom does a policy or 
command come from (a person), focus is on of the behaviour of the person in 
charge, no matter what is the content of the respective policy or how it devel-
oped. The concerned persons will accept the policy, in any case. This type of 
legitimacy seems to have  relatively little importance for the information 
transfer regulations in a modern democracy. 
The liberal constitution principle forms the foundation for sources of legitimi-
sation based on the question how a decision (law or regulation) was made. 
The form of legitimisation places a strong emphasis on the procedures fol-
lowed. Nicholas Luhman is the exponent of this school (see his book Legitima-
tion durch Verfahren). The citizens involved must be willing to accept a deci-
sion without paying any attention to the content, and they must adapt their 
own behaviour to suit this decision. This form of legitimisation also seems to 
play a minor  role in a modern democracy. 
Finally, the sources of legitimacy, which are tuned to the assessment of what 
the policy represents as to content, based on the values and norms of each 
particular individual. Stilman is the most important representative of this 
school of thought. He defines legitimacy as follows: legitimacy is the compati-
bility of the results of governmental output with the value patterns of rele-
vant systems. This form of legitimacy is most significant for the legitimisation 
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of the transfer of information obligations in the social constitutional state. 
Stilman takes over this terminology from Harold Lasswell. From Lasswell’s 
value typology, it is clear that legitimisation takes place at a sort of meta level. 
Legitimisation involves a fundamental attitude concerning values such as 
power, respect, justice, affection, well-being, prosperity, professionalism and 
enlightenment. 
The relevant systems distinguished by Lasswell are the social systems that are 
confronted with government products. Legislation and regulation in general, 
and information transfer regulations in particular, are the government prod-
ucts referred to here. Lasswell distinguishes four system levels; the interna-
tional system, society, groups within society and individuals within society. 
Businesses that are exposed to information transfer regulations could be, in 
Lasswell’s classifications, considered to be a social system. The values of busi-
nesses i.e. of the citizens that represent businesses can be considered as 
grounds for legitimisation within the framework presented by Stilman. 
One of the basic elements of the basic philosophy of the Commissie Adminis-
tratieve Lasten is the recognition of the relevance of legitimacy with respect to 
the compliance with information obligations. The Commission is warning for a 
threat of erosion of legitimacy. According to the Commission, the size, the 
complexity, the lack of transparency and the never ending changes in the 
document flows are the main reasons for this threat of legitimacy erosion.
1 
The lack of legitimacy does not refer specifically to the information obligation 
itself, but to a general negative attitude regarding the policy-making institu-
tions, the political system and the administrative law in general. 
3.3.4 Steering 
Introduction 
In the previous section we ascertained that individual citizens and businesses 
appeal to election/business lobby (instrument 1 in our model) to achieve 
certain objectives. Parliament’s decision making reflects society’s preferences 
within the multitude of objectives. The government is requested to register 
these objectives in a binding form, legislation and regulation (instrument 2) 
for the participants involved (citizens and businesses). 
Subsequently, a relevant question which arises is, how could the government 
achieve the fixed goals, and what is the role of information transfer regula-
tions?  
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This brings us to what van der Doelen termed the toolbox of the government 
- the steering models
1. Using these steering models (instrument 3 in our 
model), it is possible to shape the nature of the relationship, the legal position 
between the citizens and the government. In most cases, the government does 
not deal directly with the citizen or businesses, but it establishes bod-
ies/institutions for this purpose, such as the Tax Authorities, Labour Inspection, 
Environmental Authorities, Central Bureau for Statistics, Social Security Au-
thorities, Pension Funds, etc. The costs of such bodies are financed by the Na-
tional Budget or by specific premiums and/or levies. These are the on-budget 
costs of legislation and regulation. 
Growing horizontal relationship between government and citizens/businesses 
According to de Haan, the development of the social constitutional state was 
associated with improved horizontal relationship between government, citi-
zens and business. Besides the administrative relations between government 
and citizen/business, whereby government possesses clearly the authority (ver-
tical), the government and citizen/business co-operate with a certain degree of 
equality (horizontal), as is usually the case in a social constitution. 
The following stages can be distinguished in the process of creating this hori-
zontal relationship between the government on the one side and the citi-
zen/business on the other, in situations in which: 
•  the legal position of the citizen or business is determined solely by the gov-
ernment: conscription for military service, levying taxes. 
•  the government is dependent on the co-operation of the citizen/business: 
tax statements filled in by the citizen/business, citizen’s/business’ applica-
tion for permit or licence, the citizen or business has the right to be heard 
before a (negative) decision is made. 
•  the government recognises private persons and private organisations (busi-
nesses) and grants subsidies for the execution of public tasks. 
•  the government renounces its right to use public law in favour of semi-
legal instruments such as covenants, letters of intent or policy agreements.  
These growing horizontal legal relationships between government and citizen 
or business re-appear in various types of government steering models, the 
toolbox. 
Steering models  
Literature distinguishes three basic forms of steering models; a communica-
tive, economic and legal steering model, Winsemius illustrates these three 
types as follows. He means by steering models the different policy types or ex-
ecutive types. He added that there are three types of policy and three meth-
 
1  F.C.J. van der Doelen, ’The government’s toolbox; An inventory’, in: Policy instruments from an 
administrative point of view, J.Th.A. Bressers, P. de Jong, P.J. Klok, A.F.A. Korsten (ed.), Van 
Gorcum, Assen/Maastricht, 1993, pp. 17-31.  
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ods of execution. The policy has certain objectives - that is the hoop. Certain 
people and certain businesses have to pass through the hoop. You can make 
them do that by using laws and regulations - that is one method - the stick. 
You can also hold a carrot in front of their nose - that is the subsidy or the 
levy, perhaps. Or you can just say: well, decent people just jump through the 
hoop
1. 
In terms of our model concerning information transfer regulations, jumping 
through the hoop is a ‘content’ regulation. To inform government that you 
jumped through the hoop, is an information obligation. Such obligations can 
in principle, as we have already seen, be influenced in three different ways by 
the government. 
Legal steering model 
The legal steering model uses a stick and is coercive. This is usually accompa-
nied by sanctions. The legal steering model is the oldest and goes back to an-
cient history - the Greeks and Romans. In this model, a human is seen as a 
‘homo politicus’, who sets out norms and values in formalised rules of behav-
iour (laws and regulations) governing the conduct of the government, citizens 
and businesses. Transfer of information compliance comes into the legal steer-
ing model as soon as the government needs, in any way, to be informed about 
the compliance with the ‘content’ regulation - jumping through the hoop. 
Economic steering model 
The economic steering model uses the carrot and is not coercive. The ‘homo 
economicus’ is central in this model and is supported by Bentham’s utilitarian-
ism. This theory states that man serves two masters: pain and pleasure. Charac-
teristic of the economic steering model is the fact that the government at-
tempts to determine the advantages and disadvantages of certain choices by 
changing the consequences of these alternatives, usually with financial stimu-
lants: levies and subsidies. To obtain the subsidy or be exempt from the levy 
you have to jump through the hoop - the ‘content’ rule of behaviour. 
A significant difference between this model and the legal model is that jump-
ing through the hoop is no longer compulsory. The obligation has shifted. Two 
situations could now be distinguished. In the first situation, the person who 
does not jump through the hoop has to pay a levy (‘content’ regulation), and 
those who do jump through the hoop if they wish to be eligible for their re-
ward in the form of a subsidy have to meet the requirements stated on the 
application form. The first is to jump through the hoop, which now has the 
character of a ‘content’ regulation as a condition of obtaining the subsidy. 
 
1  F.C.J. van der Doelen, pp. 17-31, was consulted for this and the following sub-paragraph. See 
also P. Winsemius, ‘Decent people sing as they jump through the hoop’, in: NRC Handelsblad, 
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Then there is often the obligation to transfer information to supply the gov-
ernment with the information it requires granting the subsidy. 
Communicative steering model 
Finally, the communicative steering model which rests on the trust of the 
Enlightened Thinkers in human sense. If one does something bad or stupid, 
from a certain point of view, then this is a way of thinking, which is blamed on 
a lack of reasonableness, in the widest sense of the word. Using the communi-
cative steering model, the government, by transferring information to citizens 
and businesses, wants to change their behaviour, through the knowledge or 
appreciation of certain choices; it would be sensible to jump through the 
hoop. Contrary to the other two steering models, the communicative model 
knows no legal obligations; it is not compulsory to jump through the hoop. At 
most, there could be some moral obligation together with some social control 
within certain social groups such as the environmentalists, for example, 
whereby people with certain values and norms will jump through the hoop. 
From stimulating to repressive steering 
The three steering models mentioned are still too general to be used for a 
more detailed examination of the third instrument, steering, in our informa-
tion transfer regulations model. A general ban and permits/licences usually be-
long to the legal steering model. This involves completely different cases, each 
with its own consequences for content and information regulations. The same 
applies to levies and subsidies as elements in the economic steering model. In 
literature, therefore, various supplementary dimensions are added to the 
three steering models. Van der Doelen’s stimulating-repressive dimension is of 
most interest for our model. 
The distinction between increasing compulsion, or, in other words, the declin-
ing freedom of citizens and businesses, is essential. When communication is 
used as a steering model, the freedom of citizens and businesses is increased 
by the provision of knowledge. The stimulation in the economic steering 
model forms a sort of link (transitional stage) between freedom (subsidy) and 
coercion (levy). These are followed by the regulations of the legal steering 
model: thou shalt (command) and thou shalt not (prohibition). The mentioned 
dimensions are listed in the next table. 
The stimulating and repressive form of the communicative, economic and legal steering models 
Steering model  Stimulating  Repressive 
Communicative  Information Propaganda 
Economic  Subsidy Levy 
Legal  Agreement Prohibition,  ban 
Source: Van der Doelen, 1993.  
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When the steering models are combined with the stimulating/repressive di-
mension, concrete policy instruments appear in the cells. As mentioned earlier, 
the communicative steering model - because it contains no obligations, neither 
stimulating nor repressive - is no longer of importance for the development of 
our model for information transfer regulations. 
Repressive policy instruments 
The repressive policy instruments of the economic and legal steering models 
are used to impose regulations on citizens and businesses. For levies - a policy 
instrument belonging to the economic steering model - it must be said that 
the initial behaviour as to content is not compulsory, but should the business 
or citizen show signs of this behaviour, then a levy must be paid. There may be 
said to be a sort of substitute ‘content’ regulation, and that is to pay the levy. 
Should the government have to be informed, then there is the obligation to 
transfer information. Within the legal steering model we see commands and 
bans as repressive policy instruments. In both cases, there is a ‘content’ obliga-
tion for both businesses and citizens. As soon as the government, in this case, 
wishes to be informed as to what these particular citizens are doing, or not 
doing, then the obligation to transfer information appears. 
Stimulating policy instruments 
As far as the stimulating policy instruments are concerned, the translation to 
our information transfer regulations model is less unequivocal. The question is 
whether the application for a subsidy or making an agreement to achieve a 
social objective - a covenant - could lead to information transfer commitments 
for businesses and consequently to information transfer compliance costs in 
the intention of our model? Applying for subsidies and making covenants are, 
in principle, measures based on the interested parties’ freedom of choice. 
Businesses are not obliged to apply for subsidies or to make covenants. 
Let us start with subsidies, with the stimulating policy instrument as an ele-
ment of the economic steering model. With subsidies, just as with levies, the 
government attempts to steer the behaviour of the actors (businesses and citi-
zens) in the socially desirable direction. Subsidies and levies are therefore op-
posite sides of the coin. By increasing the costs of certain undesirable behav-
iour by imposing levies, that behaviour is discouraged. On the other side, 
increasing the benefits of certain desirable behaviour by granting subsidies 
stimulates this behaviour. Levies and subsidies are therefore constituent com-
ponents of the economic steering model. Exactly what a subsidy is and what a 
levy is cannot be clearly defined without considering the existing taxation 
structure. 
There is a wide variety of economically tinted policy instruments, such as cred-
its, support, contributions, guarantees, tax deduction, participation, retribu-
tions, price measures, tariffs and taxes, between the purely stimulating type of 
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therefore, that, where in the economic steering model information transfer 
regulations are imposed on businesses, the accompanying costs should be con-
sidered to be information transfer compliance costs, even when voluntary 
measures such as applying for subsidies or taking advantage of tax facilities 
(tax deductions) are involved. 
The argument that applying for a subsidy or taking advantage of tax deduc-
tions is not compulsory and that the costs involved do not include compliance 
costs - in the sense in which we consider them - is not justified. The decision to 
become an entrepreneur is almost always voluntary. If the lack of voluntarity 
criterion will be added to the definition of information transfer compliance 
costs, then these costs would be reduced to zero for businesses. The entrepre-
neur made his choice, however, voluntarily. Essential is the fact that we are 
dealing with the regulations applying to the transfer of information to the 
government, with the objective of realising relevant social goals and values. 
Finally, the agreement of stimulating policy instrument, as an element in the 
legislative steering model, will be discussed. Literature shows that there is a 
strong analogy between the use and dosage of stimulating and repressive pol-
icy instruments within the economic and the legal steering model. What subsi-
dies and levies represent in the economic steering model is represented by 
agreements and commands/bans within the legal steering model. Van der 
Doelen draws attention to the tension between legitimacy and effectiveness 
that exists in the legal steering model. ‘Thou shalt, thou shalt not’, the repres-
sive policy instruments are often confronted by resistance from society - in-
adequate legitimisation in the practical sense - and pay the penalty of reduced 
effectiveness. 
Agreements (covenants) aimed to achieve social goals, the stimulating policy 
instruments, on the other hand can boast of adequate legitimacy but are of-
ten not very effective. Combining stimulating and regressive rules and regula-
tions, the ‘mays and the musts’, seems to have a favourable effect on both the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the policy. 
Agreements, which endeavour to achieve social goals, in the form of cove-
nants such as collective labour agreements and sector agreements, do involve 
social institutions in the process and render them accomplice, and so does the 
government subsequently legitimate policy. 
Coercive regulations, and that is the other side of the coin, often act as hidden 
threats in the creation of covenants, collective labour agreements and specific 
business sector agreements. As is the case between subsidies and levies, there 
are all sorts of transitional forms between the stimulating policy instrument 
agreement and the repressive policy instrument must/must not within the le-
gal model. Some examples are permission, exemption and permits/licences. As 
we concluded for the economic steering model, it seems to be very plausible 
that, in circumstances involving covenants, collective labour agreements, and 
agreements for specific sectors of business whenever information has to be  
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provided by businesses, this should be considered to be compliance with in-
formation transfer regulations - within the context of our model - with the ac-
companying compliance costs. Here again, the decisive argument is that the 
information transfer regulations endeavour to achieve socially relevant goals. 
3.3.5 Design 
Introduction 
The government (actor 3), depending on the steering model selected (instru-
ment 3), hands over the execution of the regulations to actor 4, the imple-
menting institutions. Such implementing organisations, in turn, contact the  
businesses (actor 5) that and citizens (actor 1) who have to comply with these 
regulations. 
A reminder - the citizens fulfil a double role in the model, they are both free 
citizens who determine the objectives they wish to transfer to collectivism and 
at the same time subjects who are expected to obey the ensuing regulations. 
This double role is the essence of Rousseau’s ‘contrat social’; freedom in re-
straint. 
The obligations are shaped in instrument  4, design. As we have already seen, 
the implementing institutions impose two types of regulations on businesses; 
one as to the content and the other as to information transfer. Citizens will be 
left out of consideration from now on. The content obligations, applying to 
behaviour, are of primary importance and do stand alone. The information 
transfer obligations derived from them are a part of the administrative  en-
forcing instrument: monitoring. It is of relevance that enforcement and moni-
toring should be understood in a broad sense. At first, the enforcement and 
monitoring of the compliance with ‘content’ obligations by individual busi-
nesses is important. 
Which forms could be distinguished in the compulsory information transfer 
between businesses and implementing institutions, and to which extent does 
monitoring play a part in compliance? Which part does acceptance play in the 
way in which businesses comply with the transfer of information obligations? 
How does acceptation of the regulations influence the psychological costs for 
businesses? Which part do information transfer obligations play in complying 
with content obligations? 
As we continue to discuss the instrument design, we shall make a distinction 
between what we shall call objective and subjective aspects of design. When 
we speak of the objective aspects, we refer to items such as the structure of 
the information transfer regulations and information technology. The subjec-
tive aspects refer to how businesses experience the information transfer regu-
lations i.e. the citizens who, on behalf of businesses, have to comply with such 
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In principle, the costs of complying with information transfer obligations are 
considered by business to be high for two reasons; these are: 
•  They are high compared to other operating costs. This is an economic 
reasoning, which is linked to the objective aspects of the design of the in-
formation transfer obligations. 
•  They are found to be high without any rationale from a business economics 
point of view. In other words, a psychological reaction influenced by the 
subjective aspects of the design of the information transfer obligations. 
Objective aspects of design 
Introduction 
The objective aspects of the design of information transfer obligations apply 
to the structure of the information transfer obligations. These will be viewed 
against the background of the requirements imposed to monitor compliance. 
Then there will be a brief review of some technical aspects of the final infor-
mation question, information technology. 
The structure of information transfer obligations 
Information transfer obligations are part and parcel of an instrument used to 
enforce administrative law - monitoring/supervision. Monitoring may be either 
a passive or active information transfer obligation. We speak of an active in-
formation transfer obligation when a business, in some way or other, has to 
provide the implementing institution with information; the business has a 
‘bring’ obligation. When there is a passive information transfer obligation, the 
business has to provide the implementing institution with the opportunity to 
come and fetch the information; the implementing institute has a ‘fetch’ right. 
One complicating factor is that businesses can sub-contract the information 
transfer obligation to, for example, a bookkeeper or an accountant. In our 
opinion this is, in itself, not a separate form of information transfer obliga-
tion. The sub-contracting business remains responsible, in the eyes of the im-
plementing institution, for compliance with the information transfer obliga-
tions. In other words, within the framework of the compliance with informa-
tion transfer obligations, there is a legal relationship between the business 
that must provide the information and the implementing institution, but not 
between the bookkeeper and the accountant who actually supply the infor-
mation and the implementing institution. 
There is also the possibility to call in third parties to gather the information. 
One example is: a business provides the tax authorities with information about 
its employees for income tax purposes. Another case involves banks that must 
provide the tax authorities with information about any dividend or interest 
paid to their clients. The various types of compulsory information transfer be-
tween businesses and implementing institutions are shown in the table below.  
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Typology of obligatory transfer of information between businesses and the implementing institutions 
Information about  ‘Bring’ obligation  ‘Fetch’ obligation 
Own business  I  II 
Third parties  III  IV 
Berkvens uses the Tax Authority to work out the problem of information ex-
change
1. To illustrate the diversity of information transfer obligations, we 
have made a generalisation of Berkvens’ examples. For our purpose, the 
implementing institution thereby replaces the Tax Authority. The resulted in-
formation relationships are included in the above table. 
Quadrant I: In this case, the implementing institution requests a company to 
provide business information. The business has to send this information to the 
implementing institution. Some examples are corporate tax, VAT, the law on 
Annual Accounts and applications for permits. 
Quadrant II: This case relates to auditing the bookkeeping or controlling a 
specific situation or condition on the business floor, such as production proc-
ess, working conditions, etc., by the implementing institution. Such audits 
could involve inspection of the books by the tax authorities or checks by the 
Labour Inspection or Environmental Inspection. The statutory obligation of 
businesses to keep and update information is in fact a passive information 
transfer obligation which, being complementary to the active information 
transfer obligation of quadrant I, belongs to quadrant II. Generally, the pas-
sive information transfer regulations in quadrant II are complementary to the 
active information transfer regulations in quadrant 1. 
Quadrant III: The implementing institution requests a business to provide in-
formation about a single third party, which could be a citizen or a business, or 
about a certain category of third parties (citizens or businesses). The latter re-
fer to the so-called ‘series requests’ for information. The business must send 
the requested information to the implementing institution. Examples of such 
information regulations are requests to a company, regarding data about the 
illness of a certain employee, income tax and social insurance premiums for 
employees. Example for series requests are the obligation of banks to provide 
the tax authorities with information about the interest and dividend earned 
by their clients, requests for information within the framework of European 
Directives, for preventing misuse of financial systems for laundering money
2. 
Quadrant IV: Auditing the company’s books on the floor by an implementing 
institution to control a single third party or a category of third parties. The 
general obligation to keep and update relevant information about associated 
third parties belongs also to this quadrant. Quadrant IV concerns mainly the 
 
1 J.M.A.  Berkvens,  From Feudal Service to Information Services; on the way to the second privacy 
crisis, article, March 1992, pp. 4-6. 
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passive pendant (fetch right) and the active information transfer regulations 
(bring obligation) from quadrant III. 
To which extent does a particular enforcement situation determine the design 
of the information transfer regulation, direct/indirect or active/passive? 
Quadrants II and I relate to direct request for information to businesses about 
their behaviour. Generally, companies are themselves the best informed about 
their own behaviour. Subsequently, the active information transfer regulation 
is consistently adopted in this situation (the ‘bring’ obligation in quadrant I). 
The implementing institution plans its recurrent visits to check the available 
information about the business behaviour (‘fetch’ right in quadrant II). The 
number of checks carried out depends, among other things, on whether there 
may be a specific reason to assume that the information provided by a busi-
ness does not correspond with its actual behaviour or with the situation as it 
really is - as a consequence of the behaviour in that business. The number of 
inspections carried out will also depend on the inspection capacity of the im-
plementing institution and the presumed seriousness of the suspected discrep-
ancy between the reported behaviour/situation and the actual behav-
iour/situation of businesses. Efficiency factors dominate the choice of the 
method of requesting information in quadrants I and II. 
The transfer of information obligations in quadrants III and IV concern the in-
direct questions put to businesses about third parties. In this case, it is verify-
ing not only the behaviour or the situation of the business providing the in-
formation but also the behaviour of third parties that are connected in one 
way or another with the business providing the information. Roughly speak-
ing, two variants can be distinguished. The first seems to be prompted by effi-
ciency considerations. It deals mainly with the transfer of information about 
wages, deductions for taxation, social premiums, etc. from citizens who are 
tied to the business as employees. In most cases, the employees are not ex-
pected to supply this information to the implementation institutions them-
selves because the employer has this information. As far as verification (passive 
transfer of information obligations) is concerned, the same applies as in quad-
rants I and II. The choice for the second variant, on the contrary, originates 
from the intention to combat fraud: mainly not declaring income to the tax 
authorities. In principle, we are speaking of monitoring the behaviour of the 
clients or other contacts of the business providing the information. These cli-
ents and contacts are also subject to information transfer regulations. Should 
one wish to label the information transfer regulations as Feudal Services, then 
the regulations in quadrants III and IV are most appropriate. We expect the 
degree of acceptation of these last mentioned information transfer regula-
tions to be proportionally lower among that part of business involved. We 
shall return to this later.  
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Information logistics 
Another aspect of the design of information transfer regulations is the ques-
tioning technique; the information logistics. Many factors can have an effect 
here; for example, how the questions are formulated, the definition used and 
their link to the business administration. Request for information using forms 
or through the electronic highway, the period within which and the frequency 
with which the information is required, the professionalism of the implement-
ing institutes’ staff, etc. All these items can be expected to have a significant 
effect on the degree to which the information transfer regulations are ac-
cepted by businesses. It is specifically in the field of information logistics where 
there is everything to gain as far as the reduction of information transfer 
compliance costs is concerned. 
Subjective aspects of design 
Introduction 
Legislation is the instrument used by government to safeguard social values. In 
principle, the aim of each element of legislation is to achieve benefits, and to 
realise the implicit value at which it aims. The contemplated benefits form the 
legitimacy of both existing and new legislation. These benefits could be af-
fected only if the regulations issuing from the legislation in question are com-
plied with by businesses. 
There is increasing recognition of the fact that compliance with laws and regu-
lations in general and the transfer of information obligations in particular are 
accompanied not only by implementation costs for the government (on-
budget effects) but also by costs for businesses (off-budget costs). Compliance 
with information transfer costs imposed by laws or regulations therefore en-
ters an area of tension with more systems; the micro-systems of individual 
businesses and the macro-system of the government. 
Especially this field of tension makes the optimum compliance of business with 
the information transfer obligations a serious matter. For various reasons, a 
sub-optimal compliance and a subsequent enforcement problem could arise. 
To be able to explain this it is necessary to make first, in accordance with our 
theoretical model, a few comments about the relationship between the accep-
tation of a regulation and the compliance with this regulation. 
The acceptation of and compliance with information transfer obligations 
It should not be forgotten that when talking about the acceptance of and 
compliance with regulations there are two sorts of regulations, those which 
refer to the content - certain behaviour by a business - and the obligation to 
report this behaviour, the transfer of information obligations. 
In the future, when we speak of acceptation of and compliance with regula-
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The relationship between the acceptation of and compliance with the content 
obligations on the one hand and the transfer of information obligations on 
the other hand, is not always a ‘1 to 1’ relation. E.g. the need to inform gov-
ernment about the compliance with a fully internalised content obligation 
might be lesser. Another example: a too bureaucratic way of asking businesses 
for information could lower the compliance with the information obligations, 
also in case that the content obligation is fully accepted and complied with. 
On the one hand, legislation is a reflection of social actions already developed. 
Recording such actions in rules of conduct/behaviour (laws) is called codifica-
tion. On the other hand, there are laws that try to change or steer certain so-
cial processes and structures. Such laws have a modifying character
1. By far the 
most of the transfer of information obligations applying to businesses origi-
nate from administrative law that has a mainly modifying character. Just this 
modifying character of many information transfer obligations implies that the 
acceptation of and compliance with such regulations by businesses is by no 
means merely a matter of course. 
Potman makes a practical distinction between acceptance (of regulation) and 
compliance (with regulation). He views acceptance to be an attitude of the 
businesses involved i.e. the citizens involved on behalf of the businesses. An 
attitude consists of three components: a cognitive, an affectionate and a be-
havioural component. The cognitive component is the product of information 
processing about the information transfer regulations at a certain moment in 
time (the existence and the design). The affectionate component has to do 
with the more enduring emotions about information transfer regulations (the 
contents and the effect). As last, the behavioural component is predisposition, 
the tendency to comply - or not - with the information transfer regulation; a 
certain action. The businesses or the people involved in the businesses have all 
sorts of expectations about the consequences of their actions in their own 
situation. The acceptance of an obligation, according to Potman, does not im-
ply compliance with this obligation. Factors that affect the individual business 
and situational factors contribute to a possible discrepancy between attitude 
and behaviour. 
The acceptance of an information transfer obligation involves agreement with 
this regulation and influences the intention to take action. Action in compli-
ance with or in non-compliance with an information transfer obligation could 
depend on the assessment of this transfer of information obligation and the 
intention of how to behave based on this assessment, but there are also a 
large number of additional factors including, for example, positive or negative 
sanctions. 
 
1  H.P. Potman, p. 17. Potman took this information from T. Koopmans, ‘The role of the legisla-
tor’, in: One Hundred Years of law, Jubilee number of the Netherlands Legal Association, 
Zwolle. 1970, pp. 221-235.  
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Compliance with information transfer obligations is the behaviour of a busi-
ness, irrespective of the opinion about this regulation or the intention of how 
to behave based on this opinion. The acceptance of information transfer obli-
gations by businesses has therefore become an independent concept: qua atti-
tude acceptance. Compliance with the information transfer regulations is ac-
tion
1. 
Acceptance and psychological costs 
How does acceptance of the obligation influence the psychological costs for 
businesses? The psychological costs accompanying information transfer com-
pliance are also called irritation costs. 
As far as acceptance is concerned, in contrary to what we found in legitimacy 
in the practical sense, the firm’s utility plays a role. One may speak of a grudg-
ing acceptance of information transfer obligations by businesses if businesses 
perceive that: 
1.  little attention is being paid by parliament, ministries and implementing in-
stitutions to off-budget effects of laws and regulations (recognition prob-
lem). 
2.  there is insufficient social basis for the transfer of information obligations 
(legitimisation problem). 
3.  there are too complicated procedures for information obligations compli-
ance (complexity problem). 
4.  there is lack of transparency and clarity of the function of the information 
obligations and proportionate costs (functionality problem). 
5.  the accumulated costs of complying with the information transfer regula-
tions are for micro-systems higher than social benefits for citizens and busi-
nesses, in the absolute sense ( problem of a negative result on the social ba-
lance sheet)
2. 
6.  there is a too long time span between the realisation of the information 
transfer compliance costs and the realisation of benefits (forward planning 
problem). 
7.  the location of the information transfer compliance costs and the location 
of the benefits for the citizens and businesses are highly separated (loca-
tion problem). 
8.  there is an unequal distribution of the information transfer compliance 
costs among the various categories of citizens (self-employed versus em-
ployees, active versus non-active) and businesses (small versus large, be-
tween sectors or countries) (distribution problem). 
 
1  H.P. Potman, pp. 26-47. 
2  The fact that information transfer compliance costs could be relatively easily quantified as 
compared to social benefits which refer sometimes to un-quantifiable aggregates, is a prob-
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9.  the distribution of information transfer compliance costs among citizens 
and businesses on the one hand and the implementation costs for the gov-
ernment on the other is unequal (problem of communicating vessels)
1. 
The more the problems listed above occur, the higher the psychological costs 
of the transfer of information compliance for businesses will be. 
Enforcing content obligations 
Introduction 
Enforcement is an essential part of regulation
2. Literature defines the term en-
forcement as such to encompass all instruments, which contribute, directly or 
indirectly, to (willingness) compliance 
3. This very broad interpretation of the 
term enforcement indicates that it consists of more than coercion, and in-
cludes preventive measures. Information transfer obligations can be consid-
ered to belong to preventive measures as a whole. Which role do information 
transfer obligations play within the system of law and order? 
Concurrence of legal areas 
Enforcing the compliance of information transfer obligations usually moves 
among various legal areas. Administrative law, criminal law and civil law are 
all involved. The legal areas may be said to be an extension of each other and 
supplement each other where necessary. 
Administrative law includes administrative enforcement tools in terms of con-
trol and sanctions, whereby the implementing institutions are responsible for 
executing the compliance enforcement. Relevant examples are the withdrawal 
of permits and financial penalties. Administrative enforcement is ‘reparatoir’, 
and as such does not aim at punishing but at ‘restitutio in integrum’- restora-
tion of the desired situation. Order must be restored, to a situation which is in 
harmony with legal regulations. By imposing information transfer regulations, 
the government compels businesses to keep it informed about their actual be-
haviour or actual situations. Based on this information, the government can 
assess the extent to which actual behaviour or actual situation corresponds, 
taking into account the realisation of social objectives, to the desired behav-
iour or the desired situation. The transfer of information obligations are the 
first in a chain of administrative enforcement tools which are part of monitor-
ing. 
 
1  The way employees of implementing institutions perceive means made available for execution 
of their assignments could affect the enforcemnt of information transfer compliance. 
2 Tweede  Kamer,  Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan, vergaderjaar 1998-1999, 21 137, nrs. 1-2, p. 186, 
information transfer compliance. 
3 Tweede  Kamer,  Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan-plus, Notitie Instrumentarium, vergaderjaar 1989-
1990, 21 137, nr 22.  
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Civil law is an important supplementary enforcement tool which acts in case 
the administrative legislation is not able. Examples are to impose bans of civil 
law should businesses tend not comply with the law. 
In supplementing administrative law, criminal law provides the possibility to 
prosecute and punish suspect businesses (punitive character of criminal law)
1. 
Neither civil not criminal law knows information transfer obligations such as 
those which are the subject of this study. 
3.3.6 Summary 
Introduction 
There are four instruments in this model: elections/business lobby, legislation, 
steering and design. The election/business lobby determines the relationship 
between the citizens/businesses and the parliament. Parliament and govern-
ment interact through the instrument of legislation. The steering instrument 
enables the government and institutions to be in close contact. And, finally, 
the design instrument (of both content and the obligation to transfer infor-
mation) determines the relationship between the institutions and business i.e. 
the citizens. Each of these instruments has its own specific impact on the trans-
fer of information obligation imposed on business and therefore the accom-
panying compliance costs. The model assumes that each of the four instru-
ments has an effect on the determinants of the compliance costs. The increas-
ing directness of the effect is also considered. The election/business lobby ef-
fect is most indirect, and the most direct effect is that of the implementation 
instrument. 
Elections/business lobby 
Elections/business lobby have emerged from the collectivisation process which 
has its roots in feudal times. The increasing interdependence between rich and 
poor, a threat to the rich (external effects), formed the core of this process. 
Therefore, collective action was necessary. Such collective action took the form 
of obligatory, national and collective welfare arrangement to prevent free rid-
ing. Elections and business lobbying, certainly in principle, exert significant in-
fluence, on the choice society makes as to values and norms and, therefore, 
also on the extent and the nature of the content of codes of conduct and be-
haviour and the extent and nature of the transfer of information obligations 
applying to citizens and businesses. 
Legislation 
There are two elements which, as part of the legislation instrument, have a 
fundamental effect on the transfer of information obligations applying to 
 
1  M.J.J. van der Anker, A.B. Hoogenboom, pp. 60-61. EIM Business & Policy Research    73 
businesses: the way in which the rules of behaviour have been specified in leg-
islation and the legitimisation of this legislation. 
Transfer of information obligations belong to administrative law. The way in 
which they are established differs greatly among the various administrative 
organisations that impose these obligations. There is not one, fully compre-
hensive book for administrative law in general and the transfer of information 
obligations in particular. In general, it is possible to distinguish three clusters 
of administrative law which are relevant for information transfer require-
ments: economic, social and administrative regulations. The importance of so-
cial regulations and the accompanying transfer of information obligations is 
expected to increase. The concerted actions of parliament and government 
lead, often unintentionally, to changes - which are not part of policy - in all 
sorts of legislative domains. Complex information transfer obligations are of-
ten the result. By and large, the way in which information transfer obligations 
have been included in legislation has resulted in very little tuning between the 
various fields of legislation and, in proportion, to considerable complexity. 
There is a direct link between the extent of the legitimisation of legislation or 
a certain information obligation and the extent to which business complies 
with this regulation. To be able to understand this more clearly it is important 
to distinguish between formal and material legitimisation. Administrative law 
formally empowers the government i.e. government institutions to impose 
transfer of information obligations on businesses. The legitimising function of 
administrative law specifically aims to modify, change the status quo and not 
so much to codify, stipulate social behaviour which has already developed. 
The, in principle, modifying character of administrative law and the informa-
tion transfer obligations which accompany it indicate the importance of the 
material legitimisation of information transfer obligations. In this context, the 
material legitimisation of legislation is the attitude of businesses towards ob-
jects such as policy-making organisations, political systems, legislation itself 
and general policy making. The foundations on which the material legitimisa-
tion of content obligations and the accompanying transfer of information ob-
ligations rest are their sources, the procedures or their cohesion with business 
values and norms. It is expected that material legitimisation, as a factor which 
indirectly affects the cost of complying with information transfer obligations, 
will be more relevant for the content obligation which includes rules govern-
ing behaviour, rather than for the transfer of information obligations. There 
is, however, the threat of material legitimisation being eroded as a conse-
quence of the extent, complexity, lack of transparency and never-ending 
changes of information transfer obligations. 
Steering 
The government can choose from three types of steering models to steer the 
institutions which are responsible for implementing content and information 
transfer obligations: legal, economic and communicative. The legal steering  
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model is enforcing and can impose sanctions. The economic model is not, in 
principle, enforcing and employs financial stimuli: levies and subsidies. The 
communicative model is based on trust and the transfer of information. Both 
the legal and economic steering model recognise both the content and infor-
mation transfer obligations referred to in our theoretical model. There are no 
content or information transfer obligations in the communicative model. 
In order to encourage businesses to comply with the content obligation, the 
government, when steering the implementing institutions, can chose to use ei-
ther stimulating or repressive policy instruments. There is a wide range of such 
instruments. The legal steering model can make use of the policy instruments 
agreement (stimulating) and orders/bans (repressive), but also of many inter-
mediate forms such as permits, covenants and collective labour agreements. 
The economic steering model also offers a great variety of means: subsidies 
(stimulating) and levies (repressive) and everything between the two: credit, 
financial assistance and contributions, tax deductions, etc. We consider all 
transfer of information obligations and the accompanying costs of both stimu-
lating and repressive policy instruments, which are part of the economic and 
the legal steering model, to be transfer of information obligations and trans-
fer of information compliance costs as referred to in our model. The core crite-
rion that led us to this decision is that the information transfer obligations 
which are part of the government’s economic and legal steering model aim to 
achieve social objectives only. It is not the mould into which these regulations 
have been cast, stimulating or repressive, but the objective they aspire to 
achieve which is decisive. 
Design 
The implementing institutions can chose between various means of imposing 
information transfer obligations on businesses. In cohesion with the transfer 
of information compliance costs, both objective and subjective aspects of the 
design of the information transfer obligations are of importance. The objec-
tive aspects of the design refer to the specifications of the regulation and the 
information technology used. The subjective aspects refer to the way in which 
these regulations are viewed by businesses. Ensuring compliance with the con-
tent obligations is an important aspect when setting out the stipulations of 
the information transfer obligations and shaping the relationship between the 
implementing institutions and businesses. 
One of the objective aspects of the design of the information transfer obliga-
tions could be that the implementing institutions choose to compel businesses 
to supply the information (bring). On the other hand, there could be reasons 
why the implementing institution chooses to obtain the information from bu-
sinesses itself (fetch). These same institutions also have the right to request the 
business to provide information about third parties. Information logistics, the 
second objective aspect of design, is responsible for the interrogation techni-
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The subjective aspects of design of information transfer obligations address 
the acceptance, compliance and psychological costs of these regulations for 
businesses. The acceptance of an information transfer obligation is the fact 
that businesses can agree with this specific regulation. The extent to which 
businesses accept the regulation influences the intention to take action. To act 
in accordance with, or not in accordance with an information transfer, or to 
comply, can depend on the opinion about this regulation and the intention of 
how to behave, based on this opinion. But also on a large number of other 
factors including, for instance, positive or negative sanctions. When deciding 
whether or not to accept a regulation, the business’ own interests are an im-
portant consideration. It is possible that that there is little likelihood of a 
transfer of information obligation being accepted by business if, in the per-
ception by business, the regulation is of little or no use for business opera-
tions. In such cases there can be said to be psychological costs or irritation costs 
for businesses. 
Information transfer obligations are one component of the range of preven-
tive measures. The obligation to report about compliance with a content obli-
gation, it is assumed, will increase the chances of actual compliance with this 
regulation. Administrative law has administrative means - monitoring and 
sanction rights - which can be used by the institutions responsible for imple-
menting the regulations to enforce compliance. By imposing the transfer of in-
formation obligations, the implementing institutions compel business to in-
form them about actual behaviour or actual circumstances. Based on this in-
formation, it is possible for the implementing institutions to judge to what ex-
tent, in relation to the social objectives to be achieved, the actual situation is 
in line with the desired behaviour or desired circumstances. In this way, the 
transfer of information obligation is at the head of the chain of administrative 
enforcement methods and is part of the monitoring system. 
3.4  Determinants of information transfer compliance costs 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The relationships between the actors, as shown in the theoretical model, 
which occur via the four instruments,  election/business lobby, legislation, 
steering and design, influence the determinants of the level of compliance 
costs. These form the closing part of the model. 
Understanding these determinants improves the insights about the back-
ground of the level of the information transfer compliance costs, and helps 
identify where to interfere to avoid or reduce these costs. 
The level of information transfer compliance costs is influenced by a number 
of exogenous as well as endogenous determinants. Individual companies could 
not influence exogenous determinants, but they could do so as regards the  
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endogenous ones
1. The exogenous determinants are compatible with what we 
previously called the objective aspects of the design of the transfer of infor-
mation obligations, while the exogenous ones are more compatible with the 
subjective aspects. Using our theoretical model, we assume that in instrument 
4 (design), all those factors, whatever role they play in the previous three in-
struments, meet each other. Through instrument 4, the free citizen imposes in-
formation transfer obligations which he deems to be important on himself as 
subject, and on businesses. 
The next diagram illustrates the interdependency between the design of the 
information obligations on the one hand and on the other hand the exoge-
nous and endogenous determinants of the information compliance costs. 
 
1  M. Allers, p. 33. EIM Business & Policy Research    77 
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3.4.2 Exogenous  determinants 
The table below lists the exogenous determinants. 
Exogenous determinants 
Description  Explanation 
Decision making in Parliament  The process of decision making in Parliament determinates the 
number, the type and the content of the information obligation. 
Design of regulation  Complex regulation requires more time to be kept up-to-date, com-
plexity can also frighten people from using it (e.g. applying for sub-
sidies) and so reduce the total information transfer compliance 
costs. 
Differences in definitions  
between policy areas 




The existence of a great variety of enforcing institutions with each 
their own way of asking for information could raise information 
compliance costs. 
Design of information obliga-
tion 
Information transfers concerning non-operational processes proba-
bly lead to a higher level of information compliance costs for busi-
nesses than information transfers concerning the operational proc-
ess of a business. The choice to gather information by a ‘bring’ obli-
gation or a ‘fetch’ right might influence the level of information 
compliance costs. 
Changes in regulations  More of one-time adaptation costs. 
Technological progress  Automation, ICT, EDI, etc. result in reduced costs. On the other 
hand, the government could make use of these by asking for more 
information. 
Scale (size of business)  Because of high fixed costs and low variable costs the information 
transfer compliance costs are relatively high for small businesses. 
The complexity of the case  Deviation from the standard obligation could lead to higher infor-
mation transfer compliance costs, one example is the case of the 
self-employed (mix private-business). 
Source: M. Allers, pp. 33-35; adapted by the author. 
3.4.3 Endogenous  determinants 
Endogenous determinants of information transfer compliance costs are given 
in the table below. Of course, in most cases businesses will prefer the most ef-
ficient way of compliance. The table recapitulates some examples of endoge-
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Endogenous determinants of information transfer compliance costs 
Description  Explanation 
Own voluntary choice  It is not compulsory for a business to go to the utmost limit of infor-
mation compliance costs to minimise e.g. the tax to be paid. 
Non-compliance  Small businesses have more  possibilities for non-compliance because 
they are more difficult to monitor than big businesses. 
Degree of efficiency  Business will endeavour (via investment) to comply with the transfer 
of information obligations at the lowest possible (structural) costs.  
Source: M. Allers, pp. 33-35; adapted by the author. 
As far as endogenous costs are concerned, the relationship, mentioned earlier, 
between acceptation of the information transfer regulation (attitude) and ac-
tual compliance is important. The higher the psychological costs and the 
smaller the chance of negative sanctions, the more businesses will tend to 
choose not to comply with the information transfer regulations. Such behav-
iour may, in principle, lead to a lower level of the transfer of information 
compliance costs. But, as a reaction, the implementing institutions could make 
increased use of the monitoring and enforcement instruments at their dis-
posal. This would again result in higher information transfer compliance costs. 
And the vicious circle is complete. 
3.4.4 Summary 
In the theoretical model, the relationships between the actors, which run via 
the four instruments - election/business lobby, legislation, steering and de-
sign - affect the determinants of the level of information transfer compliance 
costs. These are the final components of the model. Knowledge of the deter-
minants leads to insight into the background of the level of information trans-
fer compliance costs. It also becomes apparent where measures could be taken 
to avoid or reduce unnecessary compliance costs. The level of information 
transfer compliance costs is influenced by a number of exogenous and en-
dogenous determinants. Exogenous determinants cannot be influenced by one 
single business, but endogenous determinants can. 
3.5 Summary  and  conclusions 
3.5.1 Summary 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the theoretical background of the regulations applying 
to the transfer of information imposed on business and the accompanying 
costs for business involved in complying with these regulations, the transfer of 
information compliance costs.  
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The theoretical model 
The core of the theory is that there are two processes involved. One process in 
which the individual preferences of free citizens and businesses is translated 
into social values, norms, rules of conduct and the obligation to adhere to 
these rules of behaviour. There is a second process in which citizens and busi-
nesses in their role of subjects are obliged to provide information about their 
behaviour or circumstances with reference to the values, norms and rules of 
conduct mentioned previously. These two processes run in opposite directions 
but both start with the citizen i.e. business. The model has five actors. Citizens 
and business operating within the private domain, parliament and govern-
ment within the public domain and, finally, the implementing institutions 
which can be active within both the private and public domains. The actors are 
all in contact with each other via instruments or tools, as we have called them 
in this model. There are four instruments in this model: elections/business 
lobby, legislation, steering and design The election/business lobby determines 
the relationship between the citizens/businesses and the parliament. Parlia-
ment and government interact through the instrument of legislation. The 
steering instrument enables the government and institutions to be in close 
contact. And, finally, the design instrument (of both content and the obliga-
tion to transfer information) determines the relationship between the institu-
tions and business i.e. the citizens. Each of these instruments has its own spe-
cific impact on the transfer of information obligation imposed on business 
and, therefore, the accompanying compliance costs. The model assumes that 
each of the four instruments has an effect on the determinants of the compli-
ance costs. The increasing directness of the effect is also considered. The elec-
tion/business lobby effect is most indirect, and the most direct effect is that of 
the implementation instrument. 
Elections/business lobby 
Elections/business lobby have emerged from the collectivisation process which 
has its roots in feudal times. The increasing interdependence between rich and 
poor, posing a threat to the rich (external effects), formed the core of this 
process. Therefore, collective action was necessary. Such collective action took 
the form of obligatory, national and collective welfare arrangement to pre-
vent free riding. Elections and business lobbying, certainly in principle, exert 
significant influence on the choice society makes as to values and norms and 
therefore also on the extent and the nature of the content of codes of con-
duct and behaviour and the extent and nature of the transfer of information 
obligations applying to citizens and businesses. 
Legislation 
There are two elements which, as part of the legislation instrument, have a 
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businesses: the way in which the rules of behaviour have been specified in leg-
islation and the legitimisation of this legislation. 
Transfer of information obligations belong to administrative law. The way in 
which they are established differs greatly among the various administrative 
organisations that impose these regulations. There is not one, fully compre-
hensive book for administrative law in general and the transfer of information 
obligations in particular. In general, it is possible to distinguish three clusters 
of administrative law which are relevant for information transfer require-
ments: economic, social and administrative regulations. The importance of so-
cial regulations and the accompanying transfer of information obligations are 
expected to increase. The concerted actions of parliament and government 
lead, often unintentionally, to changes - which are not part of policy - in all 
sorts of legislative domains. Complex information transfer obligations are of-
ten the result. By and large, the way in which information transfer obligations 
have been included in legislation has resulted in very little tuning between the 
various fields of legislation and, in proportion, to considerable complexity. 
There is a direct link between the extent of the legitimisation of legislation or 
a certain information obligation and the extent to which business complies 
with this regulation. To be able to understand this more clearly, it is important 
to distinguish between formal and material legitimisation. Administrative law 
formally empowers the government i.e. government institutions to impose 
transfer of information obligations on businesses. The legitimising function of 
administrative law specifically aims to modify, change the status quo and not 
so much to codify, stipulate social behaviour which has already developed. 
The, in principle, modifying character of administrative law and the informa-
tion transfer regulations which accompany it, indicate the importance of the 
material legitimisation of information transfer obligations. In this context the 
material legitimisation of legislation is the attitude of businesses towards ob-
jects such as policy-making organisations, political systems, legislation itself 
and general policy making. The foundations on which the material legitimisa-
tion of content obligations and the accompanying transfer of information ob-
ligations rest are their sources, the procedures or their cohesion with business 
values and norms. It is expected that material legitimisation, as a factor which 
indirectly affects the cost of complying with information transfer obligations, 
will be more relevant for the content obligation which includes rules govern-
ing behaviour, rather than for the transfer of information obligations. There 
is, however, the threat of material legitimisation being eroded as a conse-
quence of the extent, complexity, lack of transparency and never-ending 
changes of information transfer obligations. 
Steering 
The government can choose from among three types of steering models to 
steer the institutions which are responsible for implementing content and in-
formation transfer obligations: legal, economic and communicative. The legal  
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steering model is enforcing and can impose sanctions. The economic model is 
not, in principle, enforcing and employs financial stimuli: levies and subsidies. 
The communicative model is based on trust and the transfer of information. 
Both the legal and economic steering model recognise both the content and 
information transfer obligations referred to in our theoretical model. There 
are no content or information transfer obligations in the communicative 
model. 
In order to encourage businesses to comply with the content obligation, the 
government, when steering the implementing institutions, can chose to use ei-
ther stimulating or repressive policy instruments. There is a wide range of such 
instruments. The legal steering model can make use of the policy instruments 
agreement (stimulating) and orders/bans (repressive), but also of many inter-
mediate forms such as permits, covenants and collective labour agreements. 
The economic steering model also offers a great variety of means: subsidies 
(stimulating) and levies (repressive) and everything between the two: credit, 
financial assistance and contributions, tax deductions, etc. We consider all 
transfer of information obligations and the accompanying costs of both stimu-
lating and repressive policy instruments, which are part of the economic and 
the legal steering model, to be transfer of information obligations and trans-
fer of information compliance costs as referred to in our model. The core crite-
rion that led us to this decision is that the information transfer obligations 
which are part of the government’s economic and legal steering model aim to 
achieve social objectives only. It is not the mould into which these regulations 
have been cast, stimulating or repressive, but the objective they aspire to 
achieve which is decisive. 
Design 
The implementing institutions can chose between various means of imposing 
information transfer obligations on businesses. In cohesion with the transfer 
of information compliance costs, both objective and subjective aspects of the 
design of the information transfer obligations are of importance. The objec-
tive aspects of the design refer to the specifications of the regulation and the 
information technology used. The subjective aspects refer to the way in which 
these regulations are viewed by businesses. Ensuring compliance with the con-
tent obligations is an important aspect when setting out the stipulations of 
the information transfer obligations and shaping the relationship between the 
implementing institutions and businesses. 
One of the objective aspects of the design of the information transfer obliga-
tions could be that the implementing institutions choose to compel businesses 
to supply the information (bring). On the other hand, there could be reasons 
why the implementing institution chooses to obtain the information from bu-
sinesses itself (fetch). These same institutions also have the right to request the 
business to provide information about third parties. Information logistics, the EIM Business & Policy Research    83 
the second objective aspect of design, is responsible for the interrogation 
techniques. 
The subjective aspects of design of information transfer obligations address 
the acceptance, compliance and psychological costs of these regulations for 
businesses. The acceptance of an information transfer obligation is the fact 
that businesses can agree with this specific regulation. The extent to which 
businesses accept the regulation, influences the intention to take action. To 
act in accordance with, or not in accordance with an information transfer, or 
to comply, can depend on the opinion about this regulation and the intention 
of how to behave, based on this opinion. But also on a large number of other 
factors including, for instance, positive or negative sanctions. When deciding 
whether or not to accept a regulation, the business’ own interests are an im-
portant consideration. It is possible that there is little likelihood of a transfer 
of information obligation being accepted by business if, in the perception of 
business, the regulation is of little or no use for business operations. In such 
cases there can be said to be psychological costs or irritation costs for busi-
nesses. 
Information transfer obligations are one component of the range of preven-
tive measures. The obligation to report about compliance with a content obli-
gation, it is assumed, will increase the chances of actual compliance with this 
regulation. Administrative law has administrative means - monitoring and 
sanction rights - which can be used by the institutions responsible for imple-
menting the regulations to enforce compliance. By imposing the transfer of in-
formation obligations, the implementing institutions compel business to in-
form them about actual behaviour or actual circumstances. Based on this in-
formation, it is possible for the implementing institutions to judge to what ex-
tent, in relation to the social objectives to be achieved, the actual situation is 
in line with the desired behaviour or desired circumstances. In this way, the 
transfer of information obligation is at the head of the chain of administrative 
enforcement methods and is part of the monitoring system. 
The determinants of information transfer compliance costs 
In the theoretical model, the relationships between the actors, which run via 
the four instruments - election/business lobby, legislation, steering and de-
sign - affect the determinants of the level of information transfer compliance 
costs. These are the final components of the model. Knowledge of the deter-
minants leads to insight into the background of the level of information trans-
fer compliance costs. It also becomes apparent where measures could be taken 
to avoid or reduce unnecessary compliance costs. The level of information 
transfer compliance costs is influenced by a number of exogenous and en-
dogenous determinants. Exogenous determinants cannot be influenced by one 
single business but endogenous determinants can.  
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3.5.2 Conclusions 
Transfer of information obligations imposed on business are part of a greater 
whole. They are not simply the consequences of arbitrary bureaucratic deci-
sions. Information transfer obligations are an essential part of the democracy 
of the modern constitutional state. It is, however, worthwhile to subject the 
extent of these regulations to a critical appraisal. The process through which 
the preferences of free citizens and businesses are translated into social values, 
norms, content and information obligations focuses primarily on policy and 
does not pay sufficient attention to implementation aspects such as feasibility, 
enforcement and compliance. This can result in transfer of information obliga-
tions becoming too extensive and unnecessarily complicated for business. This, 
in turn, can lead to unintentional and undesirable social side effects such as in-
sufficient compliance with content obligations by businesses or excessively 
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4  Conceptualising the term information transfer compli-
ance costs 
4.1 Introduction 
The discussions about the content of the term information transfer compliance 
costs are not always enlightening. This is even more so when the more familiar 
term of administrative burdens is also applied, without any explicit explana-
tion from which point of view the discussion is being held. 
Allers indicates that, in spite of the apparent clarity of the definition, there is 
still quite some discussion as to the exact meaning of the term information 
transfer compliance costs. He even goes as far as to say that the discussion 
about the content of the term information transfer compliance costs is merely 
academic. In his opinion, each definition leads to measuring problems because 
measuring information transfer compliance costs is a complex affair. The mar-
gins for error will be substantial. Endeavouring to provide a very precise defi-
nition, therefore, according to Allers, has no sense.
1 
In this chapter we shall show that it is indeed possible to choose a better con-
tent definition for the term information transfer compliance costs. To do this, 
we have taken a statement made by Max Weber as our source of inspiration: 
‘Scharfe Scheidung ist in der Realität oft nicht möglich, klare Begriffe sind aber 
dann deshalb um so nötiger.’
2 
In this chapter will shall take a closer look at the most important elements 
which, both nationally and internationally, play a role in the discussion as to 
the exact meaning of the term transfer of information compliance costs.
3 Two 
questions will then be central: 
•  What sort of information obligations result in information transfer compli-
ance costs as referred to in social discussions? Are these only the legal obli-
gations imposed by the central government or are they also information 
regulations originating from lower authorities and grey regulations? The 
clear definition of regulations is the central theme here. 
•  What costs may be considered as information transfer compliance costs? 
Unavoidable costs only? Only those extra costs which would no longer ap-
ply if there were no legal information transfer obligation? This involves 
 
1   M. Allers, op. cit., pp. 31-32. 
2   A.J.F. Köbben, ‘Beroep: Antropoloog’, article in: Facta Sociaal-wetenschappelijk magazine, 
1999-7, p. 7. This refers to a quotation from a book by P.H.H. Vries, ‘Verhaal en betoog; 
geschiedbeoefening tussen postmoderne vertelling en sociaal-wetenschappelijke analyse’, in: 
Leidse Historische Studiën, 1995. 
3   Allers’ thesis contains a good review of the discussion up to 1995; M. Allers, op. cit., pp. 30-35.  
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making a clear distinction between information transfer compliance costs 
and the normal operating costs. 
After we have answered these questions, we shall take a closer look at two 
additional questions: what administrative measures/procedures comprise com-
pliance with information transfer obligations in general, and what cost com-
ponents form the information transfer compliance costs? 
This chapter is constructed as follows: first, the discussion around the types of 
information obligations will be dealt with. Next, attention will be paid to the 
discussion about the costs. Subsequently, the various types of administrative 
proceedings will be discussed, and, next, the sorts of costs. This chapter is con-
cluded by the definition of information transfer compliance costs. 
4.2  Definition of regulation 
Introduction 
The question to be answered is what types of information obligations result in 
the transfer of information compliance costs as referred to in social discus-
sions? Only those information obligations imposed by central government, or 
also those originating from lower authorities and grey regulations? Supple-
mentary questions are how to deal with information transfer obligations im-
posed by foreign authorities on businesses located in the Netherlands and how 
to deal with the information transfer obligations imposed by the Dutch 
government on foreign businesses operating in the Netherlands? 
In addition to the central government, lower authorities (provinces, local 
councils and water boards) all impose transfer of information obligations on 
businesses. In all these cases, regulations belonging to administrative law are 
involved. In addition, the government is increasingly choosing to achieve social 
values by using forms of regulation outside administrative law. In other words, 
more horizontal types of regulation such as self-regulation, covenants and col-
lective labour agreements. When there are more horizontal types of regula-
tion, the government refrains from imposing regulations in administrative law 
on condition that the alternative forms of regulation actually exist and are en-
forced. In literature, such regulation is also called ‘grey regulation’. Because 
opinions are changing as to the role of government it may be expected that 
this type of regulation will increase in importance. Complying with any obliga-
tion to transfer information ensuing from grey regulations will, of course, re-
sult in costs for businesses. The question is whether such costs should be in-
cluded when assessing the extent of information transfer compliance costs? 
Regulations imposed by lower authorities 
In literature there is little explicit information about the effect of transfer of 
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can be implicitly derived that the intention is to limit compliance costs in gen-
eral and information transfer costs in particular to those originating from ad-
ministrative legislation (central government and lower authorities). In large 
countries with a Federal structure, however, there is a tendency to limit the 
transfer of information compliance costs to those of complying with Federal 
transfer of information obligations. One example of this is the Paperwork Re-
duction Act (PRA) of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 
United States. When speaking about whether or not legislation from lower 
authorities should be included, the PRA says, among other things, the follow-
ing: ‘A collection of information conducted or sponsored by a Federal agency 
that is also conducted or sponsored by a unit of State, local, or tribal govern-
ment is presumed to impose a Federal burden except to the extent that the 
agency shows that such State, local, or tribal requirement would be imposed 
even in the absence of a Federal requirement’.
1 The PRA includes only the 
costs ensuing from ‘Federal regulations’ in the information transfer compli-
ance costs. This implies the regulations imposed by lower authorities are left 
out of consideration when defining information transfer compliance costs. 
This same principle also applies in Australia, for example when ‘non-Federal 
taxes’ are omitted when determining the transfer of information compliance 
costs of tax regulations.
2 
Grey regulations 
As one of the few, Allers does explicitly limit administrative law by excluding 
the grey regulations. He defines information transfer compliance costs as fol-
lows: ‘Compliance costs may be defined as the costs of complying with regula-
tions (related with tax-benefit programmes) of the private sector.’ 
3 Allers 
strictly limits the term regulations to the public domain of civil law. Obliga-
tions ensuing from other types of regulation, which are often derived form 
special parts of administrative law, such as collective labour agreements, etc. 
are not taken into consideration by him. One important consideration for Al-
lers’ choice was, in all probability, that his research focussed on financial trans-
actions to and from the government. It seems unlikely that business, taking 
into account practices in the Netherlands - would be capable of distinguishing 
the transfer of information compliance costs linked to financial transactions 
involved in items such as collective wages agreements - so-called sector 
agreements such as early retirement or training funds, from the transfer of in-
formation compliance costs ensuing from the financial transfers for the com-
pulsory legal social insurances for employees. The transfers for business sector 
agreements often go along with the transfers for legal insurances. 
 
1   Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995: Implementing Guidance, op. cit., Draft June 1999, p. 38. 
2   M. Walpole et al., ‘Taxation Compliance Costs: Some Lessons from ‘Down-under’’, in: British 
Tax Review, No. 4, Sweet & Maxwell and Contributors, 1999, p. 248. 
3   M. Allers, op. cit., p. 30.  
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In Hopkins it is not completely clear what is meant by the term ‘regulation’. He 
states that the term ‘regulation’ is not easy to define: ‘The scope both of regu-
lation (and of its cost or burden) is contentious, although a useful starting 
point is a definition of regulation as any mandated action not funded by gov-
ernment.’
1 With this definition, Hopkins makes a strong link between the 
obligatory character of the compliance and the lack of any contribution from 
government means towards the cost. In this sense, the transfer of information 
obligations imposed via self-regulation, covenants and collective labour 
agreements which also have as consequence transfer of information are com-
pliance costs as meant here. The costs of complying with such obligations is 
never, in any way whatsoever, reimbursed, therefore also not from govern-
ment means. 
The OECD also pays attention to ‘grey regulations’. ‘A closely related and rap-
idly emerging problem is that of the increasing use of ‘grey regulation’. This 
term denotes informal regulatory instruments such as guidance notes, instruc-
tions, agreements, Ministerial policies or decrees and other ‘quasi-regulatory’ 
means used by administrations to influence private behaviour. Not enough is 
known about these kinds of regulatory actions, but anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that their use is expanding throughout the OECD area and that it is very 
difficult to include them in Regulatory Impact Analysis programmes.’
2 It is in-
teresting to note which definition of regulator is used by the OECD: ‘A person 
or organisation with significant control over the content of laws or lower-level 
rules. Traditionally, this refers to parliaments and government departments 
(subject to Ministerial direction), but can also include industry or professional 
bodies, standards organisations and supra-national harmonisation bodies.
3 
In the United States, the ‘grey regulations’ are excluded from the information 
transfer compliance costs as referred to in the PRA. 
Dutch legislation and businesses operating in the Netherlands 
The study in question focuses primarily on the transfer of information obliga-
tions in the Dutch constitutional state. The Dutch government is mainly re-
sponsible for the extent of the information transfer compliance cost, insofar as 
these are the consequence of Dutch administrative law and the other obliga-
tions derived from this insofar as these affect businesses operating in the 
Netherlands. In other countries it is possible, of course, to chose for the admin-
istrative law which applies there and the effect for the businesses operation 
there. This choice can result in double counts appearing in international com-
parative studies of information transfer compliance costs. 
 
1  Th.D. Hopkins, ‘Developing general indicators of regulatory costs’, in: Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, Best Practices in OECD countries, OECD, Paris 1997, p. 263. 
2   R. Deighton-Smith, ‘Regulatory Impact Analysis, Best Practices in OECD Countries’, in: Regula-
tory Impact Analysis, Best Practices in OECD Countries, OECD/PUMA, 1997, p. 237. 
3   R. Deighton-Smith, op. cit., pp. 212-213. EIM Business & Policy Research    89 
Conclusion 
There is little discussion about including information transfer obligations im-
posed by lower authorities in the definition of information transfer compli-
ance costs. Only large countries with a Federal structure can consider excluding 
the regulations of lower authorities from consideration when determining the 
extent of information transfer compliance costs at Federal level. In order to 
obtain a complete picture and also to make international comparisons, it will 
be necessary to take separate measurements for the information transfer 
compliance costs in those areas which belong to the Federation and to add the 
aggregated results of these measurements to the Federal information transfer 
compliance costs. 
Literature is not unanimous about whether to include ‘grey regulations’ in the 
definition of information transfer compliance costs. In chapter 3, ‘Theoretical 
backgrounds‘, we looked closely at the various types of steering that the gov-
ernment could use to achieve those goals considered to be of social impor-
tance. Inside the economic as well as  inside the legal steering model we saw 
all sorts of forms of information provisions derived from stricter, purer legal 
regulations. In this context we have seen that the government can choose be-
tween various forms for the structure of the legal relationship with business, 
varying from a one-sided determination of its legal position based on a power 
relationship (the levying of taxes) to co-operation on a basis of a certain equal-
ity with semi-legal instruments (e.g. covenants). The imposition of information 
transfer regulations based on a power relationship is also seen as a vertical re-
lationship and the co-operation form as a horizontal relationship. To an in-
creasing extent, the government is relinquishing vertical relationships. Conse-
quently, individual businesses are being confronted with information transfer 
obligations originating from the organised business world (employee and em-
ployers’ associations), collective labour agreements, for example. Another ex-
ample is the environmental covenants in which businesses in a certain sector 
make mutual agreements to avoid civil law regulations. One important condi-
tion is that these covenants refer to regulations which apply to generally ac-
cepted social values and their associated norms. For instance, the quality re-
quirements that businesses in the same branch impose upon each other asso-
ciated with ISO certification are not recognised as belonging to this covenant 
unless certification also refers to values such as health and safety at work 
(Working Conditions Act) or an environmentally friendly structured production 
process (Environment Act). 
Finally, from the point of view of the individual company, and this certainly 
applies to entrepreneurs in smaller businesses, it makes no difference whether 
a regulation originates directly from administrative law or that it is an obliga-
tion imposed by parties in the collective labour agreements or comparable in-
stitutions. Therefore, we have chosen to include those costs incurred by busi-
nesses for complying with the obligation to transfer information ensuing from  
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grey regulations in the information transfer compliance costs. After all, from 
the point of view of the individual business and taking into account the trend 
towards the increasing horizontalisation of the relationship government-
business/citizen mentioned previously, the exclusion of the grey regulations 
would result in the significant curtailment of the term information transfer 
compliance costs. This choice also avoids the possibility that the, merely for-
mal, change of an information obligation from a purely legal obligation to, 
for example, a regulation based on a covenant, could lead to a reduction of 
the information transfer compliance costs for a business, while, factually, noth-
ing changes. 
In this study it has also been chosen to limit information transfer compliance 
costs to those originating from Dutch law and applying to businesses operat-
ing in the Netherlands. 
4.3  Definition in relation to normal operating costs 
Introduction 
In the discussions as to what the real information transfer compliance costs 
are, one interpretation plays a dominant role: one may speak of information 
transfer compliance costs only insofar as there are costs which are additional 
to those of normal operating costs. This is what we call the marginalist con-
cept. There are two recognisable streams within this marginalist concept. One 
of these advocates that the extra costs should be limited to the inevitable 
costs, the other considers the avoidable costs as extra costs also. The represen-
tatives of the first group will be called ‘marginalists pur sang’, the others 
‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’.
1  
Within the marginalist concept, the question of gross or net information trans-
fer compliance costs is also raised. In the fiscal domain in particular the ques-
tion arises as to what extent, when determining the information transfer com-
pliance costs, account should be taken by businesses of tax advantages gained 
through compliance. The terms ‘social compliance costs’ en ‘tax payer compli-
ance costs’ are used in literature.
2 We are inclined to consider these streams as 
a variant within the ‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’, after all the ‘mar-
ginalists pur sang’ do not accept the, in their view avoidable, costs for tax con-
sultants, etc. 
We also intend to place our own concept i.e. that of the integral costs next to 
the marginalist concept. We call our concept the integralist concept. 
 
1   Allers was our main source of information for the discussions about the marginalist concep-
tion. 
2   M. Walpole et al., op. cit., 1999, pp. 246-249. EIM Business & Policy Research    91 
The marginalist concept 
‘Marginalists pur sang’ 
The ‘marginalists pur sang’ started their discussions at the beginning of Sixties. 
In Johnston’s view, the exponent of the pur sang marginalist conception, the 
important question that should always be answered is whether the compliance 
costs increase the operating costs or whether they result only in a more inten-
sive use of existing facilities. The answer to this question depends on the ex-
tent of the utilisation of capacity and the scale to which (additional) produc-
tion factors can be involved. The extent of capacity utilised and the scale vary 
among businesses. The ‘marginalists pur sang’ are of the opinion that compli-
ance with information transfer regulation can result in genuine information 
transfer compliance costs only when these costs: 
•  are unavoidable; 
•  are not higher than the cost of the empty hours of the personnel usually 
occupied in dealing with matters connected to compliance or the costs as 
consequence of working at sub-optimum capacity; 
•  do not continue when the obligation to transfer information no longer ex-
ists. 
Therefore, Johnston makes a distinction between avoidable and unavoidable 
costs. The unavoidable costs are the consequences of strict compliance with 
the information transfer regulations as stipulated by law and regulations. 
Avoidable costs are, for example, the costs of consulting a tax advisor with the 
intention of having to pay as little tax as possible. 
Johnston also views applications for subsidies or a permit as voluntary meas-
ures which are therefore avoidable costs. 
A second item of discussion among the ‘marginalists pur sang’ is the question 
of the concurrence of the costs and normal business operations. In this case, 
the question poses the problem of how to deal with the cost of information 
transfer obligations which are complied with in the hours in which personnel 
have nothing better to do or when working below capacity. The problem here 
is to what extent can under-utilisation serve as time to be used for dealing 
with information transfer regulations. In as far as it is possible to answer ‘yes’ 
to this question, the ‘marginalists pur sang’ are of the opinion that complying 
with information transfer regulations does not result in real costs. Yocum and 
Johnston hold these views. However, both assume that businesses always have 
an optimum personnel capacity. Based on this conception, each hour spent on 
complying with administrative regulations, unless unavoidable, results in real 
costs. 
A third item of discussion is the allotment of overhead costs. Johnston defines 
tax compliance costs as being: ‘the reduction in a corporation’s operating costs 
- exclusive of the tax itself - which would result if the tax were eliminated. 
Those costs which would continue to be made in the absence of the tax cannot  
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be compliance costs’. The consequence of this approach is that most overheads 
for common facilities, such as housing, are excluded when determining the 
transfer of information compliance costs. 
‘Marginalists of the lawyers concept’ 
One of the first to distance himself from the conceptions of the ‘marginalists 
pur sang’ was Dean. In 1975, he stated that conformance with laws and regu-
lations should be considered to be an integral part of business operations. 
Dean defined information transfer compliance costs as follows: ‘all those extra 
costs which the entrepreneur must budget for simply in order to comply with 
tax requirements’. These costs would not have existed if there had been no tax 
laws. It goes without saying that this definition can be widened to include 
many other fields of legislation. 
Sandford is another well-known opponent of excluding avoidable costs. Sand-
ford suggests using the lawyers concept when defining the information trans-
fer compliance costs: ‘the costs which a reasonable man would incur’. These 
costs include the usual costs of a tax consultant and those of applying for a 
subsidy and a permit. Sandford may be considered to be the exponent of the 
‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’. 
The core of the concept of the ‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’ is that 
only those costs of complying with the transfer of information obligations 
which are in addition to the costs of normal business operations may be 
viewed as information transfer compliance costs. In other words, the costs that 
would no longer exist if there were no regulation. This concept is the most 
common one in international literature about compliance costs in general, and 
the transfer of information compliance costs in particular. As an illustration, 
several of the most prominent definitions will be presented in this paragraph. 
Sandford gives the following definition of information transfer compliance 
costs: ‘Tax compliance costs are the costs incurred by taxpayers in meeting the 
requirements laid on them by the tax law and the revenue authorities. They 
are costs over and above the actual payment of tax and over and above any 
distortion costs inherent in the nature of the tax; costs which would disappear 
if the tax was abolished.’
1 
Hopkins alternately uses the terms compliance costs and regulatory costs and 
means both content costs as well as information transfer compliance costs. 
Hopkins states: ‘The scope both of (regulation and of its) cost or burden is con-
tentious. … The burden can be defined as any adverse effect experienced in 
the private sector from such regulation.’ Hopkins then applies the classical 
concept of opportunity costs to compliance costs: ‘Fundamentally, a cost is im-
posed only if some valued resource use is displaced, and the amount of the 
 
1   C. Sandford (ed.), Tax Compliance Costs Measurement and Policy, Fiscal Publications in associa-
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cost is the value that is forgone. This is the basic economic concept of oppor-
tunity cost; if a regulation diverts no valued resources, it imposes no costs. By 
saying this, Hopkins considers only the additional costs of legislation and regu-
lation to be compliance costs which would no longer exist if the legislation 
and regulation ceased to exist.
1 
One interesting effect of this conception can be found in the regulations of 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Through these regulations, the 
government is offered an opportunity to exclude part of the costs of informa-
tion transfer compliance outside the definition of compliance costs. ‘The time, 
effort and financial resources necessary to comply with a collection of infor-
mation that would be incurred by persons in the normal course of their activi-
ties (e.g. in compiling and maintaining business records) will be excluded from 
the ‘burden’ if the agency demonstrates that the reporting, record keeping, or 
disclosure activities needed to comply are usual and customary’.
2 
In the spirit of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), information transfer com-
pliance costs should be considered to be an extra cost in relation to ‘usual and 
customary activities’. Significant is that it is stated explicitly in the PRA that the 
agency must be able to show that the activities connected to reporting, filing 
and disclosing are all activities which are part of the normal business admini-
stration. As long as the agency is not able to prove the relationship with the 
normal business administration, there will always be talk of information trans-
fer compliance costs in the sense of extra costs. That this is no simple task for 
an agency, is apparent from research by the United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO) into the cost of complying with regulations, published in 1996. 
One of the findings of this research was: ’... The companies generally did not 
identify the incremental costs that were attributable to regulatory require-
ments because they could not determine what costs they would have incurred 
in the absence of regulations. The companies’ financial information systems 
were not geared to identifying costs associated with regulations. No business 
purpose would be served by such information, and collecting it regularly 
would be a substantial incremental cost in itself.’
3 
This discussion of the opinions of the supporters of the ‘lawyers concept’ will 
be concluded with a variant from ‘Down-under’, Australia. As explained, this 
variant has its origin in the fiscal domain. The fundamental reasoning, in our 
opinion, may without objection be applied to all legislative domains in which 
financial transfers are involved. Examples are applying for subsidies or reduced 
levies in general. Of principle importance in this conception is the distinction 
 
1  Th.D. Hopkins, ‘Developing general indicators of regulatory costs’, in: Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, Best Practices in OECD countries, OECD, Paris 1997, pp. 263-265. 
2   Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995: Implementing Guidance, op. cit., Draft June 1999, p. 38. 
3   General Accounting Office, Regulatory Burden, Measurement Challenges and Concerns raised 
by selected Companies, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/GGD-97-2, November 1996, 
pp. 5, 48-52.  
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between ‘social compliance costs’ and ‘tax payer compliance costs’. The ‘social 
compliance costs’ are considered to be the information transfer compliance 
costs for society, the ‘tax payer compliance costs’ to be the transfer of infor-
mation compliance costs for businesses (and the citizens). The ‘social compli-
ance costs’ are the transfer of information compliance costs where there will 
be no settlement with possible tax advantages as a consequence of the way 
compliance took place, this is the case in the tax payer compliance costs. When 
speaking of tax advantages, these include items such a reduction of the tax to 
be paid as a consequence of the deduction of information transfer costs and 
possible financial advantages such as interest, because of the difference be-
tween the provisional and the definite statement, i.e. cash flow benefits. The 
philosophy behind this is that by using ‘tax planning’, which in itself results in 
more information transfer compliance costs, businesses and citizens will, on 
balance, obtain advantages compared with the situation without ‘tax plan-
ning’.
1 
The integralist concept 
Introduction 
As regards the integralist conception, we agree with Dean’s concept, quoted 
by Allers, that compliance during the daily work of businesses is an integral 
function of business operations.
2 The theoretical model of information trans-
fer regulations and information transfer compliance costs presented in chapter 
3 also fits well in Dean’s conception. By the way, in our view, Dean is a repre-
sentative of the ‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’. We call the fundamental 
argument the view that the compliance with regulations is an integral func-
tion of business operations and that by consequence the integral cost of the 
compliance with information obligations are information compliance costs. In 
addition, we also use a more practical argument that focuses on the impossi-
bility for businesses to imagine a situation in which there is no legislation or 
regulation. And, what is more, we support the argument for the desirability of 
a clear definition of the costs of normal business operations. 
Fundamental argument 
The fundamental argument is derived from our theoretical model in chapter 3. 
Business information transfer obligations do not exist alone. The process of 
economic generation by business is an essential and integrating component in 
the total social system. Achieving social values through pre-planned and stipu-
lated legal norms, cannot be done without the active participation of business. 
It is, therefore, quite understandable that the government, because of its ad-
ministrative responsibilities, imposes information transfer obligations on busi-
 
1   M. Walpole et al., op. cit., 1999, pp. 245-271. 
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ness to acquire information about the extent to which the business world 
complies with these norms (content obligations). The legal information trans-
fer obligations as such, and their content, can be determined simply and un-
ambiguously - if specifically specified - by consulting the specific text of the 
relevant law or grey regulations. The same applies to the work associated with 
the compliance with these regulations and the accompanying integral costs. 
The aspect of specifically specifying the information obligation will be dealt 
with in more detail in the next paragraph about the general bookkeeping ob-
ligation as a criterion for definition. When determining the integral costs, we 
are interested purely from the information logistics point of view: how much 
does it cost businesses to find out what information the government wants, to 
collect this information, make calculations, check, file and finally prepare the 
information in a suitable way to send it in and then actually send it? In other 
words: the costs of all proceedings related to the compliance with information 
obligations which a business cannot ignore without offending against the law. 
Questions about whether certain costs could be avoided or what costs would 
remain if the legislation was repealed or the net information transfer compli-
ance costs, as proposed by the marginalists, are not considered to be relevant 
in this context. The choice for integral costs in no way detracts from the fact 
that the costs of the information obligations may not exceed the benefits. 
However, the government must always strive to keep information transfer 
compliance costs as low as possible. That is why political recognition of the 
phenomenon is so important. 
Choosing such a one-dimensional concept for the integral costs of information 
logistics avoids discussions such as ‘useful for the businesses’ own operations’ 
and ‘the business did it anyway’. With this choice, we support the advice of the 
Committee for Administrative Burdens (Slechte Committee): ‘An assessment of 
administrative burdens may not be part of a wide business assessment or a 
general profit/loss analysis for proposed legislation. The Committee considers 
a separate assessment to be necessary, and this should focus exclusively on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the information logistics of laws and regula-
tions. Only when (the result of) this assessment is available, should this, to-
gether with other assessments, become part of the integral political judge-
ment. Initiatives to control administrative burdens, therefore, should not ad-
dress the question of whether the government is doing the right things (that 
is, in essence, a political question), but pose the question whether the things 
that the government wants are being done in the right way as far as adminis-
trative consequences are concerned.’
1 
Practical argument 
The practical argument for opting for the integralist conception is that busi-
nesses in general are not able to split the costs of business operations into the 
 
1   Commissie Administratieve Lasten, op. cit., p. 5.  
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cost of conforming with legislation and regulation and another part that 
would continue without regulation. We have seen one illustration of this in 
the research carried out by the General Accounting Office in the United States 
quoted previously.
1 One explanation for this is that administrative law and 
regulations derived from this law apply, to some extent, to social behaviour al-
ready developed.
2  
The social constitution, as it is known in the Netherlands, came into being 
through a process of parliamentary democracy. This implies that there is a 
more or less permanent exchange between parts of society, including busi-
nesses, and the law-making process of the government. Of course, there is 
much that could be improved in this process, but that is not the subject of dis-
cussion here. The point in question is that many transfer of information obli-
gations have been internalised - in the sociological sense - by business. ’We al-
ways do it this way’. 
One familiar example is the wage and salary administration. When setting up 
this part of the business administration, full account is taken, in addition to 
the business’ own need for information, of the content and information trans-
fer obligations in the laws on income levies and employee insurances. Provi-
sions are also made to be able to comply with the obligations ensuing from 
business sector agreements (Early Retirement, and pension schemes, training, 
education, etc.) which often form part of collective labour agreements. When 
the needs of businesses themselves and the needs of the government are so 
closely interwoven it must be deemed to be almost impossible that there can 
be one unambiguous answer to the question what are the extra costs incurred 
by complying with the transfer of information  obligations imposed by the 
government. Where do the costs of a business’ own operations cease and 
where do the costs of complying with information transfer begin? In other 
words, what costs would disappear as soon as the law on income levies no 
longer existed, and there were no employee insurances and no business sector 
agreements?  
One example as an illustration. Of course, a business wants to know what are 
the costs of e.g. the overtime work of its employees. From this point of view, 
the cost of gathering information about the number of overtime hours are 
part of the ‘normal’ operating costs and not of the information compliance 
costs. However, in most cases, taxation rates of overtime hours are different 
from normal working hours. Therefore, the government wishes to be in-
formed. From this view point, the costs of collecting, calculating, etc. these 
components of the payroll costs now are no longer the business’ own operat-
ing costs but extra costs in the sense of information transfer compliance costs. 
The question whether certain costs belong to normal operating costs or to in-
 
1   General Accounting Office, op. cit., 1996, pp. 48-52. 
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formation compliance costs is hardly to be answered unambiguously. Ques-
tions to which an unambiguous answer can be given are: what information 
does the government wish to have and what do businesses have to do to pro-
vide it, quite apart form the question whether they would have done it or not 
anyway for their own business operations. 
Bookkeeping obligation as criterion for definition 
In the integralist concept of information transfer compliance it is also neces-
sary to make a clear definition of information transfer compliance costs in re-
lation to the business’ normal operating costs.  
Businesses store information in their information systems (financial admini-
stration, stock administration, personnel and salary administration, etc.). Gen-
erally speaking, the businesses are free in their choice of system, and the asso-
ciated costs are considered to be a part of the normal operating costs. How-
ever, the government imposes a generic obligation as to the quality of such 
administration systems, the so-called bookkeeping obligation. 
The bookkeeping obligation  for private persons running a certain business is 
governed by the conditions in the Law Book of Commerce (art. 6, sub 1) and in 
the book of Common Law (art. 14, Volume 2) for legal entities, irrespective of 
whether they run a business or not. More recently, the bookkeeping obliga-
tion was also included in Common Law on national taxation (AWR, art. 52, 
sub. 1). One of the considerations when deciding to include the bookkeeping 
obligation in the national taxation law (AWR) was also to take into account 
more modern means of information transfer than books and other similar 
items. The general tendency of the bookkeeping obligation is to ensure that 
all business administration meets certain minimum requirements regarding 
clarity, auditing and filing.
1 Based on the bookkeeping regulations, it could be 
possible to choose to consider the costs of the entire business administration 
to be information transfer compliance costs. This reasoning has the attraction 
of simplicity, because then the discussion about which elements form part of 
the transfer of information compliance costs could be ended. However, the 
consequence for businesses of such a change in definition would be that these 
costs would be more than tripled.
2 We reject such a wide interpretation of the 
term transfer of information compliance and our rejection is based on the fol-
lowing arguments. 
 
1   Article 52, sub 1, of the national taxation law (AWR): Those subject to administrative regula-
tions shall conduct an administration as to their capital position and to everything concerning 
their enterprise, their independent profession or work done to the requirements of the enter-
prise, that independent profession or the work in such a way that the books and other items 
and information carriers belonging to this administration shall be kept, so that at all times 
their rights and obligations as well as data of importance for tax purposes shall be clearly 
shown. 
2  J.J. Boog et al., Administratieve Lasten Bedrijven 1993, EIM, Zoetermeer, 1994.  
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The fact that the entrepreneur is free to set up his bookkeeping system as he 
wishes is characteristic of the bookkeeping obligation. There is no sanction on 
compliance. The content of the bookkeeping obligation is determined by the 
nature and the extent of the business activities as long as the contents are re-
corded in such a way that privacy rights are guaranteed at all times. In this 
case, it is not an obligation to transfer information to the government as ad-
ministrator but to all those who, in some way or another, have to do with the 
enterprise - the stakeholders - and who benefit from a good insight into the 
ins and outs of the enterprise. These could include the banks, creditors, per-
sonnel, trade unions and, of course (local) government.
1 
The bookkeeping obligation  is, therefore, a content obligation to realise a 
certain social value (goal prescription) and not a specific, clearly defined trans-
fer of information obligation (instrumental prescription). Each enterprise is 
free to choose how to set up its administration. However, during inspections 
or audits by governmental authorities, comments and criticism can and will be 
heard if the business administration does not comply or does not comply well 
enough with the accepted usual minimum requirements in that business sector 
or size of business. ‘According to good trading practices’ can be taken as ge-
neric norm. It goes without saying that this norm will have other consequences 
for an enterprise without employees than for a multinational company. 
The table below summarises the most important elements of the discussion. 
Positioning the transfer of information compliance costs within he total business administration 
Type of information  Bookkeeping obligation*  Specific information obligation 
Useful for own business 
operations 
No transfer of information 
compliance costs 
Information transfer compliance 
costs 
Not useful for own business 
operations 
Not applicable  Information transfer compliance 
costs 
* Normal business bookkeeping which must, at least, meet the requirements of the general bookkeeping 
obligation. 
Conclusion 
In general, we reject the marginalist conception of the term transfer of infor-
mation compliance costs. The most important arguments for rejection are as 
follows. 
The ‘marginalists pur sang’ deny, in our opinion incorrectly, that the transfer 
of information compliance costs should be considered as an integral part of 
business operations. We do not consider the exclusion of avoidable costs, for 
example as the consequence of taking advice or applying for subsidies and 
permits, to have any point. 
 
1   Commissie tot verlichting van administratieve verplichtingen voor het bedrijfsleven, op. cit., 
Special Volume  III, 1985, pp. 44-45. EIM Business & Policy Research    99 
The attraction of the ‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’ gains its merit from 
the idea that compliance belongs to the integral functions of the business and 
in the acceptance of ‘the costs which a reasonable man would incur’. In this 
way, the costs for the tax consultant and for applying for subsidies and permits 
are part of the transfer of information compliance costs. 
The ‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’, however, do not succeed in making 
a clear distinction between the costs of normal business operations on the one 
hand and the extra costs as a consequence of information transfer compliance 
on the other. The fiction which they ply - the extra costs are the costs that 
would no longer exist should there be no regulation - is not feasible in daily 
business practice. For us, this is the most important reason to distance our-
selves from the opinions of the ‘marginalists of the lawyers concept’. 
Then there is also the question of the gross, ‘social compliance costs’ or net in-
formation transfer compliance costs, ‘tax payer compliance costs’. The net in-
formation transfer compliance costs are considered to be less meaningful for 
our purposes. By deducting all sorts of items of varying origin from the infor-
mation transfer compliance costs, there will no doubt be a good picture of the 
definite costs for the business that complies with the information transfer 
regulation. One important disadvantage is that the view of the real costs of 
information transfer is lost. This objection no longer applies, of course, once 
both the gross and net transfer of information compliance costs are available. 
We choose for the gross transfer of information compliance costs, or, in other 
words, the ‘social compliance costs’. 
And now we are back to our own integralist concept of the transfer of infor-
mation compliance costs. Why did we choose this? First and foremost because 
the integralist concept connects well to the basic idea of our theoretical model 
which is that compliance with information transfer regulations is an integral 
function of business operations. And with this we choose in principle for the 
information logistics approach. So, information compliance costs are the inte-
gral costs of all the proceedings to comply with information obligations in an 
adequate way and which proceedings a business cannot ignore without of-
fending against the law. To comply in an adequate way refers to the ‘lawyers 
concept’. That’s why avoidable costs like the costs of asking for advice belong 
to the integral information compliance costs. This is what we call the funda-
mental argument. 
In addition, there is also the practical argument that business would not be 
able to imagine a situation without legislation and regulation. Finally, using 
the bookkeeping obligation  as an example, we have shown that only specifi-
cally specified information obligations  result in the transfer of information 
compliance costs.  
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4.4  Definition of administrative proceedings 
Information is normally stored within business administrative systems. Exam-
ples are the financial administration, accounts receivable, stock, and personnel 
and salary administration. Even so, if entering this information into these sys-
tems requires administrative proceedings, that also applies to providing the 
government with information from these systems. Therefore, most of the ac-
tions that have to be taken to comply with information transfer regulations 
are administrative proceedings. What sort of proceedings  are then involved?  
The Paper Reduction Act (PRA) from the US is most explicit and complete in 
naming the actions generally needed to comply with the transfer of informa-
tion. The information transfer compliance costs are made up of ‘time, effort, 
or financial resources expended by persons to generate, maintain or provide 
information to or for a Federal agency, including the resources expended for: 
a. reviewing  instructions; 
b.  acquiring, installing, and utilising technology and systems; 
c.  adjusting the existing ways to comply with any previously applicable in-
structions and requirements; 
d. searching  data  sources; 
e.  completing and reviewing the collection of information; and 
f.  transmitting, or otherwise disclosing the information.
1 
When naming the administrative proceedings, Sandford makes a distinction 
between individuals and businesses. The proceedings  Sandford describes for 
individuals also apply to small independent entrepreneurs. When he writes 
about the information transfer compliance costs, Sandford names the follow-
ing proceedings, and it is important not to forget that that Sandford’s study 
was limited to transactions in the field of taxation.
2  
For individuals (read small independent entrepreneurs), the following actions 
are given: 
•  acquiring sufficient knowledge to meet their legal obligations; 
•  completing their personal tax returns, and obtaining, filing and storing the 
data to enable them to complete their returns; 
•  to visit a tax adviser or the revenue authorities; 
•  helping other family members or friends who are less able to cope. 
And for businesses: 
•  collecting, remitting and accounting for tax on the products and profits of 
the business and on the wages and salaries of its employees; 
•  acquiring and updating the knowledge to enable this work to be done, in-
cluding knowledge of legal obligations and penalties. 
 
1   Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995: Implementing Guidance, op. cit., Draft June 1999, p. 38. 
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The definition of information transfer compliance costs as these are used in 
the Netherlands Ministry or Economic Affairs’ Business Impact Assessment, 
confirms the wide scope of administrative proceedings  found: ‘Administrative 
costs are the costs of administrative regulations, i.e. the procedural and ad-
ministrative actions that businesses take for the adequate execution of the 
draft legislation. Such actions include both those actions explicitly mentioned 
in the draft regulation and also those actions necessary to comply with the 
content of the draft regulation.’
1 
Literature covers almost the entire scope of administrative proceedings  con-
nected to compliance with information transfer, including the entire prepara-
tion and follow-up. Complying with information transfer obligations, there-
fore, demands much more from business than only the act of transference it-
self. 
It is also important that proceedings  ‘of becoming acquainted with 
information transfer obligations ’ (one-off) and ‘remaining up-to-date with 
the information transfer regulations’ (structural) are mentioned explicitly. Be-
coming familiar with an information transfer obligation, for example, an 
amended or new regulation is usually seen as a one-off proceeding. Keeping 
up-to date usually refers to slight adaptations and is seen as a structural, usu-
ally annually recurring proceeding. Compliance with the transfer of informa-
tion obligations usually applies to existing legislation and regulation. 
Compliance with information transfer obligations  usually has a structural 
character, in other words, administrative proceedings  that should be carried 
out at regular periods (annually, each quarter, monthly or depending on the 
situation). There are, in addition, also proceedings  with a one-off or tempo-
rary character when:  
•  businesses are confronted with major changes in existing regulations, for 
example, the introduction of a new taxation system;  
•  businesses have to deal with new regulations. 
The situation in which business are confronted, for the first time, with existing 
regulations does not belong to the one-off classification; for example, starters, 
but also businesses which have existed for a longer period and for the first 
time employ personnel or start to export. When making a distinction between 
one-off proceedings  and structural proceedings, changes in legislation are the 
most important factor and not the specific situation of a business. 
Conclusion 
Complying with the transfer of information obligations is usually accompanied 
by the following administrative proceedings:   
1.  becoming (one-off) and remaining (structural) familiar with the transfer of  
information obligations; 
 
1   Ministry of Economic Affairs, Business Impact Assessment, op. cit., p. 16.  
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2.  receiving the information; 
3.  collecting the required information; 
4.  judging whether the information transfer obligation  is applicable; 
5.  filling in or entering the required information; 
6.  making calculations or valuations; 
7.  printing out the results of the calculations; 
8.  checking and possibly correcting the results; 
9. obtaining  advice; 
10. consultation; 
11. explanation; 
12. executing the instructions to pay; 
13. sending the information, the message; 
14. filing the data. 
4.5  Definition of costs 
What sort of costs or cost components should be counted as belonging to in-
formation transfer compliance costs?  
Literature usually distinguished the following categories: financial costs, time 
spent and psychological costs.
1 In an analogy with the administrative proceed-
ings, the types of costs mentioned can also be classified as either structural or 
one-off costs, depending whether they recur annually or not. Those costs con-
nected with structural proceedings  are called structural information transfer 
compliance costs. The structural transfer of information compliance costs are 
usually fixed annually. The principal item of one-off costs is the cost of keep-
ing up with changes and any costs connected to the re-structuring of the busi-
ness administration. 
In literature the dominating concept is that information transfer compliance 
costs consist not only of financial payment, but that  the time spent by the en-
trepreneur and/or his paid or unpaid employees or family workers  - expressed 
in money - should also be taken into account. Psychological costs are men-
tioned, but the general opinion is that these cannot or should not be valued in 
terms of money. Psychological costs are therefore not included in the transfer 
of information compliance.
2 This in no way detracts from the fact that psycho-
logical or irritation costs play an important role in the acceptance of and com-
pliance with the information transfer regulations. In chapter 3, when discuss-
ing the instrument design as part of our theoretical model, this item was dealt 
with. 
 
1   M. Allers, op. cit., 1994, p. 31. 
2   M. Allers, op. cit., 1994, p. 31, C.T. Sandford, op. cit., 1995, M. Walpole et al., op. cit., 1999, pp. 
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In general, a business economics approach is chosen for the costs which form 
the constituent components of the transfer of information compliance costs. In 
the Paperwork Reduction Act (US), two sorts of costs (burdens) are distin-
guished which should be measured separately:
1  
1.  Time, measured in hours and sub-divided into four qualification levels: 
•  clerical and other unskilled workers; 
•  skilled- and craft-labour and other technical workers; 
•  professionals and managers; 
•  executive. 
All wage rates need to be full-loaded, i.e. reflect the full cost of labour includ-
ing fringe benefits. 
2.  Financial costs and all other aspects of burden, including both non-
recurring costs and recurring costs. All costs need to be valued at market 
prices. 
The Regulatory Impact Assessment (UK) also chooses for a broad business-
economics approach and distinguishes between structural and once-only costs: 
•  ‘recurring costs: additional and indirect costs arising from the legislation, 
such as extra administrators, ‘opportunity costs’ (i.e. the cost of existing 
staff who might otherwise be used more profitably), consumable materials, 
periodic inspections and licence fees’; 
•  ‘non recurring costs: one-off costs such as additional expenditure on plant 




All costs have been measured on a full cost basis, regardless of whether extra 
expenditure would actually be incurred. For example, staff time has always 
been valued at gross salary costs plus 50 per cent to 60 per cent (for overhead 
and accommodation), even though, in most cases, extra staff would not need 
to be recruited.’
4 
In literature there is consensus about a business-economics approach to infor-
mation transfer compliance costs: time is money and the costs should be calcu-
lated at market prices. Together with payroll costs, capital costs are also part 
of information transfer compliance costs. Overheads should also be included 
when ascertaining the costs of information transfer compliance. The psycho-
logical costs are mentioned but  not measured in time or money and are 
 
1   Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995: Implementing Guidance, Draft June 1999, p. 47. 
2   Department of Trade and Industry, The Deregulation Initiative, Checking the Cost to Business, 
a Guide to Compliance Cost Assessment, UK, December 1992, p. 1. 
3   Better Regulation Unit, The Better Regulation Guide and Regulatory Impact Assessment, UK, 
1998, p. 37. 
4  B. Glassberg, C. Smyth, ‘Tax Compliance Costs: The Problems and the Practice - Inland Reve-
nue’, in: Tax Compliance Costs Measurement and Policy, C. Sandford ed., Fiscal Publications, 
1995, pp. 33-34.  
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therefore excluded from the definition of transfer of information compliance 
costs. 
The distinction between structural annually recurring and one-off costs in in-
formation transfer compliance costs is of essential importance. 
Conclusion 
Transfer of information compliance costs consist of: 
a.  if the businesses themselves execute the transfer of information: 
•  Wage/salary costs and/or the valued wage of the entrepreneur 
•  Costs for the computers, software, etc. used 
•  Allowance for overhead costs; 
b.  if the businesses out-source the execution of the information transfer regu-
lations: the cost of out-sourcing. 
4.6  Summary: definition of information compliance costs 
Having looked at all aspects, we now arrive at the following definition of 
structural and one-off information transfer compliance costs. 
Structural information transfer compliance costs 
 
Structural information transfer compliance costs are the  integral costs of 
the annually recurring administrative proceedings  connected to comply-
ing with the obligation to transfer information, as specifically stipulated 
in the regulation applying to businesses operating in country X, to the 
government or comparable body of country X, which obligation business 
cannot ignore without offending against the law. The government or 
comparable body of country X uses the information thus obtained to 
check and maintain compliance with content obligations deemed by soci-
ety to be of value.  
This definition contains a number of core elements which require some expla-
nation: 
•  Structural costs: The annually recurring costs for compliance with transfer 
of information obligations. 
•  Integral costs: The integral cost price of all the administrative proceedings  
which are necessary to comply with a transfer of information obligation. 
This refers to Sandford’s lawyers concept. Only those reasonable costs can 
be counted as belonging to the information transfer compliance costs. As 
we, following Dean’s example, consider compliance with the transfer of in-
formation obligation as an integral function of business operations, the 
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•  Administrative proceedings: All activities that are necessary for the compul-
sory transfer of information to the government or the implementing insti-
tution to take place. These actions include the 14, mainly administrative, 
actions previously mentioned. 
•  Regulation: All legislation and regulation used by the central government 
and lower authorities together with other bodies with delegated authority, 
to control their legal relationship with businesses in connection with so-
cially stipulated behaviour. These also include grey regulations. 
•  Specifically stipulated information transfer obligation: Accurate and precise 
definition in legislation and regulation of the content of the information 
that the business must provide to the government or implementation insti-
tution. This passage clearly defines the distinction between this and the 
generic information which is stored in the business administration. 
•  Businesses operating in country X: Within the terms of reference of this 
study, the subject is the Netherlands and the legislation and regulation that 
apply to the Dutch and foreign businesses operating on Dutch territory. 
This definition is important in order to prevent double counts should inter-
national comparative studies be made. Business is taken to include all pri-
vate individuals and legal persons who are engaged in business and not in 
the government sector, in the sense of the internationally applicable 
definitions according to the National Accounts. 
•  Government or comparable body of country X: The Dutch government and 
comparable Dutch bodies. 
•  Which a business cannot ignore without offending against the law: This re-
fers to the legal obligation to transfer information and is the core of the 
definition. It indicates explicitly that information transfer compliance costs 
are not exclusively the extra costs that would disappear should the law dis-
appear (the concept of the marginalists). The transfer of information com-
pliance costs are the costs of all the administrative proceedings  required to 
actually execute the information transfer, whether these actions are of any 
use for the businesses’ own operations or not.  
•  Content obligations regulations deemed by society to be of value; rules of 
behaviour/conduct which apply to values and norms, laid down by parlia-
mentary decree in legislation or regulation or in grey regulations derived 
from these. 
One-off transfer of information compliance costs 
The definition of one-off transfer of information compliance costs is identical 
to that for structural transfer of information compliance costs, as long as it is 
remembered that this applies only to situations in which there are major 
changes to existing laws and regulations, or new laws and regulations.  
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